Presidential Administration Under Trump by Farber, Daniel A
UC Berkeley
UC Berkeley Previously Published Works
Title
Presidential Administration Under Trump
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/48p719z5
Author
Farber, Daniel A
Publication Date
2017-08-08
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
Presidential Administration Under Trump
Daniel A. Farber1 
Anne Joseph O’Connell2
I. Introduction
[I would widen the Introduction: focusing on the problem of what
kind of president Donald Trump is and what the implications are. The
descriptive and normative angles do not seem to have easy answers.
There  is  a  considerable  literature  in  political  science  and  law  on
positive/descriptive theories of the president.  Kagan provides just one,
but  an  important  one.  And  there  is  much  ink  spilled  on  the  legal
dimensions.  I  propose that after flagging the issue, the Introduction
would provide some key aspects of Trump as president, maybe even
through a few bullet points conveying examples, raise key normative
questions, and then lay out a roadmap for the article. One thing to
address  is  what  ways we think  Trump is  unique for  a  study of  the
President and for the study of Administrative Law, if at all.]
[We should draft this after we have other sections done.]
Though the Presidency has been a perennial  topic  in  the legal
literature, Justice Elena Kagan, in her earlier career as an academic,
penned an enormously influential 2001 article about the increasingly
dominant  role  of  the President  in  regulation,  at  the expense of  the
autonomy  of  administrative  agencies.3 The  article’s  thesis,  simply
stated, was that “[w]e live in an era of presidential administration.”, by
1 Sho Sato Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley.   
2 George Johnson Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley. 
3 Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001). According
to Westlaw, the article had been cited over 800 times in law reviews as of the end of
July 2017. Some of the important contributions to the literature on this issue include
Kathryn  A.  Watts,  Controlling  Presidential  Control,  114  MICH.  L.  REV. 683  (2016);
Sidney A. Shapiro and Richard Murphy, Constraining White House Political Control of
Agency Rulemaking Through the Duty of Reasoned Explanation, 48 UC DAVIS L. REV.
1457 (2015); Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics to Arbitrary and Capricious
Review," 90 WASH. U . L. REV. 141(2012); Robert V. Percival, Who’s in Charge? Does
the  President  Have  Directive  Authority  Over  Agency  Regulatory  Decisions?,  19
FORDHAM L.  REV. 2487 (2011);  Kathryn  A.  Watts,  Proposing  a Place  for  Politics  in
Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 1 (2009) [hereinafter Place for Politics]; Kevin Stack,
The President’s  Statutory Powers to Administer  the Laws,  106  COLUM.  L.  REV.  263
(2006).  Perhaps it is well to state at the outset that my description of Kagan’s views
is based on this article alone, rather than any assumption one way or another about
how those views may have evolved in the meantime.
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which  she  meant  that  the  White  House  rather  than  administrative
agencies had become the dominant force in controlling the direction of
federal  regulation.4 Kagan’s  article  did  not  simply  document  the
emergence  of  presidential  administration;  it  also  celebrated  this
development.  She  argued  that  “in  comparison  with  other  forms  of
control,  the  new  presidentialization  of  administration  renders  the
bureaucratic  sphere more transparent and responsive to the public,
while also better promoting important kinds of regulatory competence
and dynamism.”5 
Kagan admitted that presidential administration posed risks, but
she argued that those risks were manageable. In turning to possible
critiques  of  her  position,  Kagan  contended  that  any  tendency  by
presidents to push past the edges of legality can be combatted by the
courts.6  She also argued that the risk of displacing agency expertise
was overblown by critics, although she admitted this as a possibility.7
Still,  Kagan  conceded,  “[f]uture  developments  in  the  relationship
between the President and the agencies may suggest different judicial
responses;  the  practice  of  presidential  control  over  administration
likely will  continue to evolve in ways that raise new issues and cast
doubt on old conclusions.”8  
Although the Trump Administration is still less than a year old, it
already seems to provide just the kind of evidence of “evolution” that,
in  Kagan’s  language,  raises  new  issues  and  casts  doubt  on  old
conclusions. In terms of his role in the administrative state, President
Trump  has  used  many  of  the  same  tools  as  Bill  Clinton,  Kagan’s
primary  exemplar,  in  order  to  control  the  administrative  state  and
stamp its output with his “brand.” It is too soon to assess the long-term
implications of Trump’s election for American politics, and we cannot
be sure whether he is part of a trend or a political outlier.9 But Trump’s
4 Kagan, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 2246.
5 Id. at 2252. 
6 Kagan, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 2349-50. Bruce Ackerman
has emphasized the risk that the President “will be tempted to achieve his objectives
by  politicizing  the  administration  of  whatever-laws-happen-to-be-on-the-books.”
Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 712 (2000).
Ackerman continues, “To be sure, an impartial reading of these statutes might imply
that his initiative falls far beyond the limits of legal authority; but with his political
partisans  in charge of  the  administration,  why shouldn't  the  president  encourage
them to bend the law to fulfill the administration's program?” Id.
7 Id. at 2352-2355.
8 Kagan, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 2385.
9 For discussions by legal academics of the larger implications of the election, see
Eric  Posner,  Can  It  Happen  Here?  Donald  Trump  and  the  Paradox  of  Populist
Government (June  2017),  available  at  https://ssrn.com/abstract=2893251;  Scott
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approach to governance has alarmed legal scholars across the political
spectrum,  not  just  liberals  who  are  predictably  dismayed  by  his
policies.10  
Prominent  conservative legal  scholars have questioned Trump’s
ability to lead the administrative state and his respect for the rule of
law. For instance, Jack Goldsmith called on courts to relax their usual
presumption  in  favor  of  the  legality  of  administrative  actions  given
what he called Trump’s instability.11  Only a month after Trump took
office, Eric Posner questioned whether “Trump can last even one term
unless his top advisers take away his phone, lock him in a closet, and
let him out only for carefully scripted ceremonies which are taped so
that  they  can  be  edited  before  broadcast  to  the  public.”12 Posner
flagged Trump’s inability to receive the trust or support of the federal
bureaucracy as a particular source of weakness.13 Shortly before the
Dodson,  Dahlia  Lithwick,  Bertrall  Ross,  and  Joan  Williams,  The  2016  Presidential
Election: The Next Four Years and Beyond, 44 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 256 (2017)(panel
discussion); David Orenlicher, Political Dysfunction and the Election of Donald Trump:
Problems of the U.S. Constitution’s Presidency, 50 IND. L. REV. 247 (2016).
10 For  instance,  Professor  Laurence  Tribe  has  called  for  Trump’s  impeachment.
Laurence,  J.  Tribe,  Trump Must  be  Impeached.  Here’s  Why,  WASH.  POST (June 17,
2017),  available  at  https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-must-be-
impeached-heres-why/2017/05/13/82ce2ea4-374d-11e7-b4ee-
434b6d506b37_story.html?utm_term=.27d971a4a869. 
11 Goldsmith took to social media to express his view of the President: 
Given POTUS’s instability, it is not just courts that have reason to relax
the presumption of regularity for this Prez. ... We all have reason to do
so about everything the Executive branch does that touches, however
lightly,  the  President.  ...One  thing  DT  [Donald  Trump]  behavior
entails...is many losses in court and not just on the immigration EOs
[Executive Orders]....Everything else Executive would normally win—
reversing Clean Power Plan, terminating treaty, new regs, etc.—will be
much, much harder.
Josh Gerstein,  Trump's Tweets Prompt Backlash from GOP Lawyers, Politico (June 5,
2017),  available  at  http://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/05/trump-tweets-
republican-lawyers-backlash-239148.
12 Eric  Posner,  Is  Trump  Finished? (Feb.  17,  2017),  available  at
http://ericposner.com/is-trump-finished/. 
13 
Trump doesn’t seem to understand that a successful president needs
the support of the bureaucracy; he can’t boss agency officials around
like Trump Organization employees, but must act through them. If he
attacks them for political reasons, or is incapable of telling the truth,
they will not trust him. If they don’t trust him or if they fear him, they
will not do his bidding. They may even try to undermine him. In fact,
they already have.
Id.
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2016  election,  a  group  containing  many  of  the  most  prominent
conservative law professors signed an open letter accusing Trump of
being  “indifferent  or  hostile  to  the  Constitution’s  basic  features—
including a government of limited powers, an independent judiciary,
religious liberty, freedom of speech, and due process of law.”14 Michael
McConnell  said  that  Trump’s  attacks  on  federal  judges  regarding
pending cases were “shredding longstanding norms of etiquette and
interbranch  comity”  and  were  “extremely  self-defeating  and  self-
destructive” because they would result in more rigorous scrutiny of his
actions by federal judges.15  
As  the  next  section  of  this  Essay  describes,  the  Trump
Administration  deviates  from  Kagan’s  expectations  for  presidential
administration  in  some  disturbing  ways.   Rather  than  providing  a
coherent,  uniform  approach  to  policy,  the  White  House  is  riven  by
internal factions that independently seek public support for their views.
We  will  also  see  that  commentators  have  a  firm  basis  for  their
concerns about the Administration’s adherence to the rule of law.  And
rather than deferring to agency experts, the Administration has often
cut them out of the loop and has shown itself hostile in important ways
to traditional forms of expertise.  Putting entirely to the side whether
one agrees or disagrees with the President’s  policy decisions, these
process issues cannot but raise doubts about Kagan’s normative case
for Presidential Administration. 
Despite the temptation to view the Trump Administration as an
outlier,  in  important  respects,  it  is  continuing  the  trend  toward
centralizing regulatory authority while echoing or amplifying types of
behavior  found to a lesser extent  in  earlier  Administrations.   Under
George  W.  Bush,  the  White  House  tightly  controlled  regulatory
decisions.16 Writing  before  Trump  took  office,  Kathryn  Watts  cited
Barack Obama as having “elevated White House control over agencies’
regulatory  activity  to  its  highest  level  ever.”17 Obama,  like  Trump,
exploited  the  potential  of  on-line  media  to  publicize  his  regulatory
directives – in Obama’s case through use of the White House website,
14 Jonathan  Adler  et  al.,  2016 Statement  Originalists  Against  Trump,  available  at
https://originalistsagainsttrump.wordpress.com/2016-statement/.  Among others, the
signatories included Richard Epstein, long a conservative icon, and Steven Calabresi,
co-founder of the Federalist Society.
15 Julie Hirschfeld David, Supreme Court Nominee Calls Trump’s Attacks on Judiciary
‘Demoralizing’,  NY  TIMES (Feb.  8,  2017),  available  at
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/us/politics/donald-trump-immigration-ban.html.
16 Watts, Presidential Control, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 692-
698.
17 Id. at 698.
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on-site videos, blogs, and social media including Twitter.18 On occasion,
Obama ran roughshod over the views of agencies’ scientific experts,19
although this seems to have been a more pervasive issue in the Bush
Administration.20  Bush  and  Obama  both  exploited  the  system  for
White  House  regulatory  review  first  established  by  Reagan  via  the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).21 It remains to be
seen how much the Trump Administration will rely on this method of
agency  control,  but  Trump  issued  an  executive  order  early  in  his
Administration  imposing  important  new  restrictions  on  agency
rulemaking  and  directing  OIRA  to  enforce  those  restrictions.  Thus,
there  are  important  commonalities  between  Trump  and  his
predecessors that make it harder to dismiss his relevance to broader
debates about presidential power.
This is not to say that observers are wrong to consider Trump’s
approach  to  the  presidency  as  exceptional.   Although  borrowing
governance  methods  from  his  predecessors,  he  may  be  going  to
greater extremes in the frequency and degree of his reliance on those
methods, so that what was previously exceptional seems now to be a
more central part of governance.  But nevertheless, there are some
clear continuities with his predecessors, in method if not necessary in
policy.  The policies themselves are not our present concern, but what
is of  concern  is  the  way  those  policies  are  formulated  and
implemented.
In Part II of the essay, I will describe the current operation of the
Trump White House, which I believe is likely to anticipate his future
governing  style.  It  is  admittedly  still  early  in  Trump’s  term,  but  he
seems unlikely to radically change his current approach to governance,
particularly because his approach to being Chief Executive mirrors his
long-established habits as a business executive.22 
18 Id. at 704.
19 Id. at 706.
20 Id. at 696-698.
21 Id.  at  693-696,  698-700.   For  more  on  scientific  integrity  issues  under  these
administrations,  see Heidi  Kitrosser,  Scientific Integrity:  The Perils and Promise of
White House Administration, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2395 (2011). Another important form
of presidential control is provided by OMB’s role in the budget process, the theme of
Eloise Pasachoff,  The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy, 125 YALE L.J.
2182, 2207 (2016).  It is unclear how effective that mechanism will be under Trump,
given the negative congressional response to his first budget request even by many
members  of  his  own  party.  See  Bob  Ryab,  Trump's  Budget  is  Facing  Massive
Blowback in  Congress  — and Republicans Are Some of  the Loudest  Complainers,
BUSINESS INSIDER (May 23, 2017), available at  http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-
2018-budget-white-house-republicans-2017-5.  But that topic lies outside the scope
of this essay.
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Part III  then turns to some on-going disputes about presidential
power in administrative law, such as whether the president has the
power to displace agency heads as decision-makers or only to remove
them if they fail to follow his instructions. Experience thus far with the
Trump  Administration  undercuts  Kagan’s  positions.   In  particular,  I
argue,  that  experience should  lead us  to reject  her call  for  a more
expansive  view  of  the  president’s  power  to  issue  legally  binding
dictates  to  agencies,  as  well  as  her  argument  that  presidential
involvement  in  an  agency  action  should  lead  to  greater  judicial
deference.  On the contrary, the need for a check against White House
disregard for the rule of law and expert knowledge should lead to a
presumption that the president does not have this type of  directive
power over agencies unless Congress specifically grants that power.
While presidential efforts to influence an agency should be grounds for
overturning an agency action only in extreme cases, it may sometimes
warrant  a  court  in  taking  a  harder  look  at  the  legal  and  factual
foundations of that action.
My arguments are designed to ensure that the voice of agency
professionals is head and plays a central role in agency decisions.  The
question is one of balance. Under recent presidents (not only Trump),
the balance of power has shifted away from experts within agencies to
political actors, often in the White House.23  In my view, the shift has
gone too far. One of the abiding themes of administrative law is the
tension  between expertise  (largely  housed  in  the  bureaucracy)  and
political  accountability  (centered primarily in the White House).  It  is
worth  considering  whether  the  balance  has  shifted  too  far  in  the
direction of politics rather than expertise.  Yet expertise is not all that is
at stake: excessive centralization may also pose risks to the rule of
law, particularly under current circumstances.   
II.  [Organizational Structure and Behavior] Theories of the
President 
22 One point of divergence should be noted.  Due to his private sector activities and
some post-election actions, it was anticipated that one important strategy for Trump
would be negotiating deals with firms to take desired actions, rather than using more
formal legal methods of influencing their behavior.  See Steven Davidoff Solomon and
David Zaring,  The Dealmaking State: Executive Power in the Trump Administration
(2017),  available  at  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2921407.
Thus far, however, this has not become an important part of Trump’s presidency.
23 For a historical account of how the balance between expertise and politics in the
rulemaking process evolved in the direction of politics prior to the Clinton Presidency,
the subject of Kagan’s analysis, see Peter L. Strauss,  From Expertise to Politics: the
Transformation of American Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745 (1996). Further
developments  under  presidents  succeeding  Clinton  (George  W.  Bush,  Barack  H.
Obama, and Donald J. Trump) are covered in later sections of the present essay.
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[I would briefly lay out three or four theories of the President: (1)
Organizational  Leader  (Kagan  but  also  some  political  science);  (2)
Personality-Focus (covering both the “going public” theory but also a
vision  theory  of  leadership);  (3)  Franchise  President  (us).  For  each
theory, I would first sketch it out and then show what aspects of Trump
fit it.]
[I will write up (2) and the theory part of (3).  It would make sense
for you to edit what you have for (1) (I can provide you the political
science so it is not all about Kagan) and for you to do the as applied
part of (3)].
Kagan’s argument relied importantly on assumptions about how
the president, the White House, and agencies function and interact.
Although President Trump has only been in office for a limited time, it
is not too early to begin drawing some tentative conclusions about how
his  Administration  makes  decisions.   One  reason  to  think  that  the
months in office will  turn out  to be representative is  that Trump is
continuing methods of management that he used for decades in the
business  world.   We  begin  with  a  discussion  of  those  established
patterns of behavior.
A.  Trump’s Private Sector Background
To understand how Donald Trump has approached the office of
the  presidency,  it  is  important  to  understand  his  experience  in
business.  Unlike publicly held businesses, which are subject to a web
of regulations regarding their governance and disclosures, Trump was
the head of a family business with no public accountability.24 The one
exception was Trump Hotels and Casino Resorts, a public venture that
collapsed.25
Trump’s business success was largely based on creating a brand
around his own lifestyle and marketing the brand aggressively.  As one
commentator  explained,  “After  going  through  bankruptcies  and  the
ups and downs of the real estate market, he has learned to reduce his
risk.  He puts his name and his image to work while keeping the costs
and exposure low.”26 Thus, properties license his name, so that “[h]e
gets a fee for lending out his name, makes sure there’s quality control
24 Bert  Spector,  Trump  Wasn’t  a  Real  CEO.  No  Wonder  His  White  House  is
Disorganized,  WASH.  POST (Feb.  21,  2017),  available  at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/02/21/trump-wasnt-a-real-
ceo-no-wonder-his-white-house-is-disorganized/?utm_term=.3801a27755b6. 
25 Id.
26 Shaun Rein, Genuine Business Lessons From Donald Trump, FORBES (May  4, 2009),
available at https://www.forbes.com/2009/05/04/donald-trump-marketing-leadership-
managing-image.html.
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and gets great marketing out of having another bit of Trump-branded
property in the market place.”27
This low-risk strategy was a result of hard experience.  Early in his
career, he experienced large losses in three real estate partnerships
financed by Chase. He then moved into casinos with the Trump Plaza
Corporation, developing the property in return for financing and casino
management  by  Harrah’s. 28  Building  on  the  publicity  from  this
venture,  he purchased a  nearly  complete  Hilton  Atlantic  City  Hotel,
then acquired the Taj Mahal using junk bonds.29 At around the same
time, he acquired Eastern Airline’s northeast shuttle, renaming it the
Trump Shuttle.30  By 1990, his ventures were struggling to no avail, but
he was  able  to  secure  an additional  bank loan.31  By  2009,  Trump
Entertainment  Resorts  filed  for  bankruptcy  four  days  after  Trump
resigned from the board, owing $3.4 billion.32
Trump’s wealth, estimated by  Fortune at $3.72 billion, is almost
entirely  in  the  form  of  real  estate,  including  office  buildings,  golf
courses  and  clubs,  and  apartment  buildings.33  Fortune also
characterized  him  as  highly  litigious  and  prone  to  take  on  debt
recklessly.34  According to a CNN report,  his  real  estate enterprises
include over 560 entities in which he has an ownership share.35  For
instance,  “Trump’s  stake  in  the  1200  Avenue  of  the  Americas
commercial property in New York City. . . is held within at least a dozen
companies,  including  three  limited  liability  companies,  three
corporations,  and six  limited  partnerships.”36  Of  these hundreds  of
entities,  many  are  shell  companies  owning  shares  in  other  entities
rather than conducting business operations.37
27 Id. 
28 Kurt  Eichenwald,  Donald Trump’s  Many Business  Failures,  Explained,  NEWSWEEK
(August  12,  2016),  available  at  http://www.newsweek.com/2016/08/12/donald-
trumps-business-failures-election-2016-486091.html. 
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Shawn Tully and Roger Parloff, Business the Trump Way, FORTUNE (April 21, 2016).
34 Id.
35 Drew  Griffin,  Scott  Bronstein,  and  Curt  Devine,  Trump’s  Tangled  Web  of
Businesses,  CNN  (Jan.  10,  2017),  available  at
http://money.cnn.com/2017/01/10/news/trump-business-conflicts/. 
36 Id.
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About half of Trump’s wealth consists of investments in four major
buildings in New York and San Francisco.38  But marketing the Trump
name now seems to be much of the business focus, as noted above.  A
recent press account lists over thirty such licensing deals in countries
around the world, about half in the United States.39
Because  Trump’s  business  empire  involves  real  estate
investments combined with licensing, it does not require the type of
organization  that  would  be  needed  to  manage  major  properties  or
construction projects. The president of his shuttle airline said that “[i]t
surprised me how much of a family-type organization it was, instead of
a business kind of orientation where there is a structure and there is a
chain  of  command  and  there  is  a  delegation  of  authority  and
responsibility.”40 Trump’s principal management responsibility was “a
core group of barely more than a dozen executives housed on the 26 th
floor  of  Trump  Tower.”41 Based  on  extensive  interviews,  Politico
described the views of business associates and biographers:
In  recent  interviews,  they recounted  a  shrewd,  slipshod,
charming,  vengeful,  thin-skinned,  belligerent,  hard-
charging  manager  who  was  an  impulsive  hirer  and  a
reluctant firer and surrounded himself with a small cadre of
ardent  loyalists;  who  solicited  their  advice  but  almost
always  ultimately  went  with  his  gut  and  did  what  he
wanted.  .  .  ;  and  who  fostered  a  frenetic,  internally
competitive,  around-the-clock,  stressful,  wearying  work
environment  in  which  he  was  a  demanding,  disorienting
mixture  of  hands-on and hands-off—a hesitant  delegator
and an intermittent micromanager who favored fast-twitch
wins  over  long-term  follow-through,  promotion  over
process and intuition over deliberation.42
As we will see, many of these management practices would later
carry over into Trump’s early term as President. Trump’s approach to
37 CBS News, A Guide to Donald Trump’s Business Empire (Dec. 13, 2016), available
at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-business-empire/.  
38 Id. [CBS News Guide].
39 Aaron Williams and Anu Narayanswamy, How Trump Has Made Millions by Selling
His  Name,  WASH.  POST (Jan.  25,  2017),  available  at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/trump-worldwide-licensing/. 
40 Michael  Kruse,  ‘He’s  a  Performance  Artist  Pretending  to  be  a  Great  Manager’,
POLITICO (Feb.  28,  2017),  available  at
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/02/hes-a-performance-artist-
pretending-to-be-a-great-manager-214836.
41 Id.
42 Id.
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the  presidency  may  also  have  been  guided  by  his  television
experience.   As  one  journalist  put  it,  “What  Washington  has  been
trained to  see as  disorder  .  .  .  is  actually  a  long-running  theatrical
event. The Trump Show, a time-tested method by which the star builds
excitement, demands attention and creates soap-operatic story lines
that at least superficially seem like success.”43 Trump has described
how the “key to his business success . . . was to solidify in the public’s
mind that ‘Trump’ means ambition,  wealth and a distinctly personal
expression of success.”44
Trump’s business was notably litigious.  A newspaper was able to
identify  over  four  thousand  lawsuits  involving  Trump  or  his
businesses.45  After examining the records, the newspaper concluded
that  “Trump  frequently  responds  to  even  small  disputes  with
overwhelming legal force, not hesitating to use his tremendous wealth
and  legal  firepower  against  adversaries  with  limited  resources.”46
Perhaps the most notable was a lawsuit accusing Trump and others of
fraud in  connection  with  Trump University,  which  resulted in  a $25
million settlement.47  Trump had accused the federal judge overseeing
the case with being biased against him because of the judge’s Mexican
heritage, given Trump’s adversarial stance toward Mexico.48
B. The White House: Internal Operations
The Trump transition was indicative of the initial direction of the
Administration. The transition team had compiled thirty large binders
of  information  and  recommendations,  with  detailed  plans  and
timetables.49  But soon after the election the transition chair, Governor
43 Marc Fisher,  President Trump Wants to Put on a Show. Governing Matters Less
(Feb.  24,  2017),  available  at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/02/24/president-trump-
wants-to-put-on-a-show-governing-matters-less/?utm_term=.ff5a073f6628.
44 Id.
45 Nick  Penzenstadler  and John Kelly,  How 75 Pending Lawsuits  Could  Distract  a
Donald Trump Presidency: Two Weeks Before Election Day, Dozens of the 4,000-Plus
Lawsuits  Involving Trump and His Businesses Remain Open,  USA Today (Oct.  25,
2016),  available  at
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/10/25/pending-lawsuits-
donald-trump-presidency/92666382/. 
46 Id.
47 Steve Eder and Jennifer Medina,  Trump University Suit Settlement Approved by
Judge, NY TIMES (March 31, 2017), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/
us/trump-university-settlement.html?_r=0. 
48 Id.
49 Dan  Balz,  ‘It  Went  Off  the  Rails  Almost  Immediately’:  How  Trump’s  Messy
Transition  Led  to  a  Chaotic  Presidency,  Wash.  Post.  (April  4,  2017),  available  at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/it-went-off-the-rails-almost-immediately-
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Chris  Christie,  was  replaced  by  Vice  President  Pence,  a  decision
prompted  by  Jared  Kushner,  the  president’s  son-in-law.50 Trump
ignored some recommendations of the transition team and ignored the
timetable, eliminating time for vetting nominees.51 
Within a month of Trump’s inauguration, observers were already
commenting  on  his  unorthodox  approach  to  managing  the  White
House in what commentator called a great natural experiment in public
administration.52  One distinctive and continuing aspect of the Trump
White House has been an unusual propensity toward leaks.  This was
also  noted  very  early  in  Trump’s  term.53 According  to  reports,  the
“breadth  of  the  leaks  has  surprised  –  and  of  course,  delighted  –
journalists,” including tidbits such as transcripts of presidential phone
calls  to  foreign  leaders.54 Some  spoke  of  competing  power  centers
within the White House,55 and management experts were concerned
about lack of consultation and suppression of dissent.56 Insiders also
complained about being kept in the dark about important decisions,
and some advisors recommended monitoring of staff cellphones and
emails  for  leaks.57 Other  observers  noted  Trump’s  tendency  to
complain to others about the actions of senior administration officials:
“Trump seems to keep a running list of whom he likes best—and least
—among his top advisors, constantly updating the rankings . . . And,
how-trumps-messy-transition-led-to-a-chaotic-presidency/2017/04/03/170ec2e8-
0a96-11e7-b77c-0047d15a24e0_story.html?utm_term=.a9784deae107. 
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 See  Daniel  W.  Drezner,  The  First  Great  Natural  Experiment  of  the  Trump
Administration,  WASH.  POST.  (Jan.  19,  2017),  available  at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/01/19/the-first-great-
natural-experiment-of-the-trump-administration/?utm_term=.d5098659a077. 
53 Paul Frahi, The Trump Administration Has Sprung a Leak.  Many of Them, In Fact.,
WASH.  POST.,  available  at  https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/the-trump-
administration-has-sprung-a-leak-many-of-them-in-fact/2017/02/05/a13fad24-ebe2-
11e6-b4ff-ac2cf509efe5_story.html?utm_term=.b3683f6b0422. 
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 James B. Stewart, Case Study in Chaos: How Management Experts Grade a Trump
White  House,  WASH.  POST (Feb.  3,  2017),  available  in
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/business/donald-trump-management-
style.html?_r=0. 
57 David E. Sanger, Eric Schmitt, and Peter Baker,  Turmoil at the National Security
Council,  From  the  Top  Down,  NY  TIMES (Feb.  12,  2017),  available  at
https://nyti.ms/214OBBM. 
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most strange of all, Trump seems entirely comfortable sharing that list
with anyone.”58  
By February 10, less than a month after his inauguration, there
were  reports  that  Trump  was  finding  the  transition  from  business
owner to Bureaucrat-in-Chief a difficult one.59 Reporters – admittedly,
perhaps,  not  disposed  in  his  favor,  said  that  interviewees  “paint  a
picture of a powder keg of a workplace where job duties are unclear,
morale among some is low, factionalism is rampant and exhaustion is
running high.”60
In the first six months, Trump eschewed the “strong chief-of-staff”
model  favored  by  predecessors61 in  favor  of  competing  centers  of
influences.  This has led to a tangle of lines of communication, with no
clear  connection  to  bureaucracy  below  the  cabinet  level.62 Most
presidents in the past fifty years have favored the use of a strong chief
of staff to help control the volume of incoming information, scrutinize
its  reliability,  when  necessary  tell  the  president  he  is  wrong,  and
58 Chris Cillizza,  We’ve Never Seen Anything Like Trump’s Rough Treatment of His
White  House  Staff,  WASH.  POST. (Feb.  13,  2017),  available  at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/13/weve-never-seen-
anything-like-donald-trumps-treatment-of-his-white-house-staff/?
utm_term=.e48f9bcf5b27. 
59 Alex Isenstadt, Kenneth P. Vogel, and Josh Dawsey, Scale of Government, POLITICO
(Feb.  10,  2017),  http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/donald-trump-challenges-
governing-presidency-234879. 
60  Id. [in a separate section authored by Josh Gerstein].
61 This  model  seems  to  have  dated  back  to  Robert  Halderman  in  the  Nixon
Administration, but the most successful modern practitioner may have been James
Baker under Reagan. See Chris Whipple, THE GATEKEEPERS: HOW THE WHITE HOUSE CHIEFS
OF STAFF DEFINE EVERY PRESIDENCY 13, 23, 87, 89-90, 95-102 (2017).
62 As one journalist with three decades of experience put it, 
A table of organization of Trump’s executive branch would, as always,
start with a box at the top representing the president. Beneath it would
be  a  series  of  boxes  —  White  House  staffers,  Cabinet  officers,
subcabinet  officials  and  the  like.  Many  of  those  boxes  would  be
connected  by  intersecting  lines,  save  for  one.  No  solid  line  would
connect the president to the rest of the government, only a dotted line
or no line at all.
Dan Belz, A President Divorced from the Executive Branch He Oversees, WASH. POST
(June  7,  2017),  available  at  https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/a-president-
divorced-from-the-executive-branch-he-oversees/2017/06/07/cb4402cc-4ba1-11e7-
bc1b-fddbd8359dee_story.html?utm_term=.e304f7809b63.   The  National  Security
Advisor has reportedly experienced similar problems in serving as a single point of
access  to  the  President.  Eli  Lake,  Trump’s  'Axis  of  Adults'  Is  Breaking  Apart,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (July  22,  2017),  available  at
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-07-21/trump-s-axis-of-adults-is-
breaking-apart 
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ensure  that  presidential  decisions  are  effectively  implemented  and
communicated by staff.63 The main exception was Jimmy Carter, and
his effectiveness as president suffered as a result.64 
The ouster of Reince Priebus and his replacement with John Kelly
in  late July  may be an attempt to impose order on the tumultuous
White House.65  Attempting to play the role of a strong chief of staff is
likely  to  be  a  difficult  task  in  the  Trump White  House,  because  of
Trump’s use of social media and the impossibility of limiting access to
him by family members such as Ivanka Trump and her husband Jared
Kushner, both of whom are in the White House. Kelly’s appointment
was  paired  with  the  appointment  of  Anthony  Scaramucci  as
communications director a few days earlier. Scaramucci had promptly
attacked  Priebus  and  Bannon  in  a  profanity-laced  phone  call  to  a
reporter,  in  which he said he was going to have the FBI  launch an
investigation into a “leak” that turned out to involve publicly available
information.66 In  turn,  Kelly  almost  immediately  forced  Scaramucci
out,67 and took strong steps to assert control over staff.68
There are several significant players within the White House. Jared
Kushner, the President’s son-in-law, has considerable influence.  Steve
Bannon and his supporters are deeply at odds with Kushner and the
“New York Moderates.”69 Aligned with Kushner is Gary Cohn, head of
the  National  Economic  Council,  who  was  also  rumored  to  favor  a
63 Id. at.
64 Id. at 112-122,
65 Peter Baker and Maggie Haberman,  Reince Priebus Is Ousted Amid Stormy Days
for  White  House,  NY  TIMES (July  29,  2017),  available  at
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/28/us/politics/reince-priebus-white-house-
trump.html?emc=edit_th_20170729&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=15539613&_r=0.
66 Peter Baker and Maggie Haberman, Anthony Scaramucci’s Uncensored Rant: Foul
Words  and  Threats  to  Have  Priebus  Fired,  NY  TIMES (July  27,  2017),  available  at
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/us/politics/scaramucci-priebus-leaks.html. For a
pessimistic assessment of Kelly’s ability to bring order to the White House, see Peter
Baker,  Trump Tries to Regroup as the West Wing Battles Itself,  NY TIMES (July 29,
2017),  available  at  https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/29/us/politics/trump-
presidency-setbacks.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-
heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0. 
67 Tara  Palmeri  and  Josh  Dawsey,  Trump  Ousts  Scaramucci  as  Communications
Director, POLITICO (July  31,  2017),  available  at
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/31/trump-ousts-scaramucci-as-
communications-director-241172. 
68 Glenn Thrush, Michael D. Shear, and Eileen Sullivan,  John Kelly Quickly Moves to
Impose Military Discipline on White House, NY TIMES (Aug. 3, 2017), available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/03/us/politics/john-kelly-chief-of-staff-trump.html?
emc=edit_th_20170804&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=15539613&_r=0.
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carbon  tax.70  Cohn  has  been  described  as  “a  central  force  in  the
vicious policy battles playing out in President Donald Trump’s White
House.”71 Kushner  and  Bannon  have  engaged  in  what  some  have
called a civil war within the White House,72 vying for influence on the
President.  Indeed, the Bannon-Kushner conflict seems to have defined
much of the early Trump Administration, not only in terms of internal
politics but as part of a “larger struggle to guide the direction of the
Trump presidency, played out in “disagreements over the policies Mr.
Trump should  pursue,  the people he should  hire  and the image he
should  put  forth  to  the  American  people.”73 Supposedly,  “the  main
players have grown so wary of leaving Mr. Trump’s side that it  has
become hard to organize meetings of senior officials without him, to
thrash through policies or hiring choices, slowing up an already fitful
process.”74 
The various players play shifting roles, as their influence on the
President  is  thought  to  wax  or  wane.  By  mid-April,  Kushner  was
thought to be in ascendancy, leading to resentment by others who lack
a familial  connection  with  the President.75  Kushner’s  influence was
69 Philip Rucker and Robert Costa, Inside Trump’s White House, New York Moderates
Spark  Infighting  and  Suspicion,  WASH.  POST (March  18,  2017),  available  at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/inside-trumps-white-house-new-york-
moderates-spark-infighting-and-suspicion/2017/03/18/51e3c4d2-0b1c-11e7-a15f-
a58d4a988474_story.html?utm_term=.3fa5229c1ab2. 
70 Josh Dawsey, Annie Karni, and Andrew Restuccia, Carbon Tax Debate Exposes Rift
Among  Trump’s  Aides,  POLITICO (March  21,  2017),  available  at
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/03/trump-carbon-tax-white-house-236327.
According to one observer, at least, Bannon’s real fight is against Gary Cohn. Olivia
Nuzzi,  Steve  Bannon’s  Biblical  Fall   (April  16,  2017),  available  at
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/04/steve-bannons-biblical-fall.html. 
71 Nancy  Cook  and  Andrew  Restuccia,  Inside  the  White  House’s  Policymaking
Juggernaut,  POLITICO (July  5,  2017),  available  at
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/05/trump-gary-cohn-policy-battles-national-
economic-council-240217.  According  to  Cook  and  Restuccia,  Cohn  has  been
particularly at odds with Peter Navarro, the White House Trade Advisor, who favors a
nationalist, anti-globalist perspective akin to Bannon’s.  Id.
72 Sarah Ellison, The Inside Story of the Kushner-Bannon Civil War,  VANITY FAIR (May
2017),  available  at  http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/04/jared-kushner-steve-
bannon-white-house-civil-war. 
73 Maggie Haberman, Jeremy W. Peters, and Peter Baker, In Battle for Trump’s Heart
and  Mind,  It’s  Bannon  vs.  Kushner,  NY  Times  (April  6,  207),  available  at
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/politics/stephen-bannon-white-house.html.
74 Id.
75 Ashley Parker and John Wagner,  Kushner has a Singular and Almost Untouchable
Role  in  Trump’s  White  House,  Wash.  Post  (April  3,  2017),  available  at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/daily-202/2017/04/13/
daily-202-trump-s-lurch-toward-corporatism-globalism-shows-why-bannon-s-
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reflected in a move away from nationalism toward globalism in the
Administration’s foreign policy stance.76 By late May, however, there
were reports  that  other  aides  were pressuring Kushner to  withdraw
from his active White House role due to fallout from investigations into
the  Trump  campaign’s  contacts  with  Russia.77  By  the  end  of  July,
commentators were dismissing the influence of Kushner and his wife,
Ivanka  Trump,  on  policy,  while  noting  their  greater  influence  on
important personnel decisions.78
The internal frictions within the White House were exemplified by
the  battle  over  withdrawal  from  the  Paris  Agreement  on  climate
change.  Bannon was supported by EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt and
White  House  Counsel  Don  McGahn,  while  Ivanka  Trump,  economic
advisor  Gary  Cohn,  and  Secretary  of  State  Rex  Tillerson  opposed
withdrawal.79 Ms. Trump organized a campaign of CEOs to support the
agreement, culminating in a full-page ad in the  Wall Street Journal.80
The President ultimately stuck with the position he had taken during
the campaign and decided to withdraw from the agreement.81  All of
these internal debates took place in full public view. Bannon, who had
marginalization-matters/58ef11ebe9b69b3a72331e7d/?
utm_term=.ecee4bf3baa8.https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/kushner-has-a-
singular-and-almost-untouchable-role-in-trumps-white-house/2017/04/03/df4e7cf8-
1897-11e7-855e-4824bbb5d748_story.html?utm_term=.a104f7058efa.   Kushner’s
family connection may empower him to be more objective and could lead to better
delegation,  but could always lead to obvious issues of  favoritism and resentment
from other staff.  See Jeffery Sonnenfeld, Trump’s White House Is a Family Business.
That’s Not a Bad Thing, POLITICO (April 8, 2017), available at http://www.politico.com/
magazine/story/2017/04/trump-white-house-family-business-215002. 
76 James  Hohmann,  Trump’s  Lurch  Toward  Corporatism,  Globalism  Shows  Why
Bannon’s Marginalization Matters, WASH. POST. (April 13, 2017), available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/daily-202/2017/04/13/daily-202-
trump-s-lurch-toward-corporatism-globalism-shows-why-bannon-s-marginalization-
matters/58ef11ebe9b69b3a72331e7d/. 
77 Glenn Thrush, Maggie Hagerman, and Sharon LaFraniere, Jared Kushner’s Role Is
Tested  as  Russia  Case  Grows,  NY  TIMES  (May  28,  2017),  available  at
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/28/us/kushner-trump-relationship-russia-
investigation.html.
78 Annie Karni  and Eliana Johnson,  Ivanka and Jared Find Their Limits in Trump’s
White  House,  POLITICO  (July  30,  2017),  available  at
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/30/ivanka-trump-jared-kushner-241149. 
79 Ashley  Parker,  Philip  Rucker  and  Michael  Birnbaum,  Inside  Trump’s  Climate
Decision: After Fiery Debate, He ‘Stayed Where He’s Always Been’, WASH. POST. (June
1,  2017),  available  at  https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/inside-trumps-
climate-decision-after-fiery-debate-he-stayed-where-hes-always-been/2017/06/01/
e4acb27e-46db-11e7-bcde-624ad94170ab_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-
main_parisreconstruct-850pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.bdc827ff7195.
80 Id.
81 Id.
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been rumored to be on his way out in April, had successfully managed
to overcome resistance from Ivanka Trump and Rex Tillerson.82
Notably, Secretary Tillerson, from the department (State) with the
most  direct  expertise  on  international  agreements,  had  strongly
opposed Trump’s  ultimate decision  and remained unrepentant  after
the fact.  Gary Cohn, Director of the National Economic Council, also
strongly  opposed  withdrawal.83   On  the  other  side,  “Pruitt,  who
frequently  attacked  the  EPA's  regulations  in  court  when  he  was
Oklahoma’s attorney general, used his new post as EPA administrator
to  orchestrate  an  aggressive  campaign  to  marshal  conservative
opposition to the Paris agreement.”84 
There is no indication that Pruitt ever consulted climate change
experts on EPA’s staff about the Paris Agreement.  Instead, Pruitt has
led a campaign for Administration-wide action to challenge well-settled
climate science.85  Given scientifically unfounded statements by other
cabinet-level  officials  on  the  subject,  he  has  presumably  found  a
receptive audience.86 
82 Alexander Nazaryan, Steve Bannon Regains Power, As Paris Withdrawal Shows, 
NEWSWEEK (June  2,  2017),  available  at  http://www.newsweek.com/steve-bannon-
regains-power-paris-withdrawal-619895.  By mid-July, however, Bannon was said to
have pulled back from policy debates in order to maintain his position in the White
House.  See  Eliana  Johnson  and  Annie  Karni,  Steve  Bannon’s  Disappearing  Act,
POLITICO (July 21, 2017), available at http://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/21/steve-
bannons-disappearing-act-240778.  If  so,  this  is  an  indication  of  the  instability  of
White House affairs.  
83 Andrew Restuccia and Josh Dawsey,  How Bannon And Pruitt Boxed In Trump On
Climate  Pact  --The  Two  Advisers  Have  Spent  Months  Building  Pressure  On  The
President  To  Exit  The  Paris  Deal  —  And  Trying  To  Outmaneuver  Ivanka  Trump,
Politico (May 31, 2017), available at http://www.politico.com/story/2017/05/31/trump-
paris-climate-agreement-239008. 
84 Id.
85 Brady  Dennis  and  Juliet  Ellperin,  EPA Chief  Pushing  Governmentwide  Effort  to
Question  Climate  Change  Science,  Wash.  Post  (July  1,  2017),  available  at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/07/01/epa-
chief-pushing-governmentwide-effort-to-question-climate-change-science/?
utm_term=.6e3ad15e8003. 
86 See Chris Mooney,  A Flurry of Recent Statements Suggest Widespread Climate
Doubt  in  the  Trump  Administration,  WASH.  POST (June  23,  2017),  available  at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/06/23/there-
really-isnt-much-mystery-about-what-trump-and-his-government-think-about-climate-
change/?utm_term=.c1d14c320834. 
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Thus, Trump’s decision turned out to be relatively expertise-free,87
and was attributed to a combination of outside pressure and Trump’s
long-time  conviction:  “The  president  has  long  believed,  rightly  or
wrongly, that the U.S. is getting a raw deal under the accord, and it
proved nearly impossible to change his mind.”88  Whether or not the
final decision was wise, it seems clear that scientists were shut out of
the  process.  And  the  others  trying  to  change  his  mind  faced  an
insurmountable hurdle.
As the struggle over the Paris Agreement indicates, staff members
have felt  free to  rally  public  support  for  their  positions  outside  the
White House, in the hope of influencing the President. The contending
White House officials have hired their own chiefs of staff and public
relations  staff.89 The  use  of  independent  public  relations
representatives  for  staff  within  the  White  House  appears  to  be  a
unique development in the Trump Administration,  seemingly in part
because members of  other factions do not  trust the press  office to
protect their interests.90 
Management experts worry that key White House staff members
are too fractious  and too eager to gain favor  with the President  to
constitute an effective “team of rivals.”91  The warring power centers
seem to have originated a slew of leaks, with White House staff and
agency heads describing a “litany of suspicions”, including efforts by
87 The decision was widely condemned by foreign policy experts and economists.
See Jennifer  Potvin,  What  Brookings  Experts  Have Said  on Trump’s  Paris  Climate
Accord  Decision,  (June  6,
2017),  /https://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2017/06/06/what-brookings-
experts-have-said-on-trumps-paris-climate-accord-decision/;  Devon Ryan,  Q&A with
Stanford Experts on the President’s Paris Climate Agreement Decision (June 1, 2017)
available  at  http://news.stanford.edu/2017/06/01/qa-climate-experts-paris-
agreement-decision; Robert N. Stavins, The Economics (and Politics) of Trump's Paris
Withdrawal,  Harvard  Kennedy  School  Belfer  Center  for  Science  and  International
Affairs  (June 6, 2017)(“the president has little understanding of the nature of  the
agreement,  the  process  for  withdrawal,  or  the  implications  of  withdrawal  for  the
United  States,  let  alone  for  the  world”),  available  at
http://www.belfercenter.org/publication/economics-and-politics-trumps-paris-
withdrawal. 
88 Restuccia and Dawsey [“Boxed in” article], supra note Error: Reference source not
found.
89 Tara Palmer,  Trump’s Aides Build Their Own Empires in the West Wing, Politico
(July  6,  2017),  available  at  http://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/06/trump-west-
wing-staff-kushner-240244. 
90 Id.
91 Annie Linskey, Warring West Wing Factions Dismay Management Experts,  BOSTON
GLOBE (Feb.  18,  2017),  available  at
https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2017/02/18/trump-first-month-has-
management-experts-shaking-their-heads/X8QBWGZozkaqLw4IOFpXeM/story.html. 
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rival factions to undermine them with leaks, prompting extraordinary
efforts to keep communications secret from other groups.  They also
fear sabotage by anti-Trump agency staff.92  By all accounts, tensions
escalated after the effort to pass a major health care bill hit a speed
bump  in late March of 2017.93  
There  are  undoubtedly  potential  benefits  of  allowing  scope  for
conflict  within  government  organizations  in  terms  of  generating
information  and  promoting  accountability.94  For  that  reason,  it  is
possible that the existence of competing White House power centers
might have advantages.  But the conflicts may also be interfering with
the operation of the White House by absorbing energy in internecine
strife  and  confusing  communications  to  and  from  the  rest  of  the
executive branch.  In addition, given that any president necessarily has
limited individual bandwidth, the existence of competing claims on his
attention  may  produce  diversity  at  the  expense  of  informational
breadth and depth.95 
Furthermore,  the  willingness  of  staff  members  to  publicize
conflicting views outside the White House undermines the president’s
ability  to  communicate  a  clear  message.  In  addition,  members  of
Congress may be confused about the White House’s positions. During
negotiations  over  health  care  reform,  legislators  complained  that
“different White House aides are giving different pitches and messages
to Capitol  Hill  lawmakers on replacing Obamacare.”96 Vice President
Michael Pence has played a significant advocacy role with Congress,
perhaps smoothing some of these conflicts.97
92 Alex Isenstadt and Kenneth P. Vogel, ‘People Are Scared’: Paranoia Seizes Trump’s
White  House,  POLITICO (March  15,  2017),  available  at
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/03/trump-white-house-paranoia-236069. 
93 Alex  Isenstadt,  White  House  Blame Game Intensifies  as  Trump Agenda  Stalls,
POLITICO (March 26, 2017), available at http://www.politico.com/story/2017/03/trump-
blame-agenda-stalls-236508. 
94 For an extensive discussion of these possible benefits, see Daniel A. Farber and
Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agencies as Adversaries [forthcoming, Cal. L. Rev.]
95 Advisors also risk the President’s disfavor, potentially expressed in front of other
staff members. See Nancy Cook and Josh Dawsey,  Trump Loses Patience with His
White  House  Counsel,  Politico  (June  23,  2017),  available  at
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/23/trump-don-mcgahn-white-house-counsel-
russia-239876 (“No top aide is immune from the president’s anger or being called out
in front of colleagues. . . “).
96 Dawsey, Karni, and Restuccia, supra note Error: Reference source not found.
97 Glenn Thrush  and Maggie  Haberman,  Amid White House Tumult,  Pence Offers
Trump  a  Steady  Hand (March  28,  2017),  available  at
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/28/us/politics/vice-president-mike-pence.html?
_r=0. 
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The  turmoil  is  an  indication  of  unsettled  communication  and
reporting lines within the White House. Perhaps Kelly’s appointment as
Chief of Staff will address these problems, though some of them seem
likely  to  be  recalcitrant.  Whatever  happens  within  the White House
itself, as we will see in the next section, there have been strong efforts
to further increase the centralization of the executive branch.
C.  The White House: Relationship with Agencies
As with his predecessors, Trump has attempted to restructure the
administrative process to strengthen White House control. At the end
of his first month in office, President Trump issued an executive order
imposing a “regulatory cap” on compliance costs and requiring that at
least  two  regulations  be  repealed  whenever  a  new  regulation  is
adopted.98 Another executive order called on the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget to “submit to the President a proposed
plan  to  reorganize  the  executive  branch  in  order  to  improve  the
efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of agencies.”99 In another
bid to exercise more control  over agencies, a working group in the
White House Counsel’s office is charged with devising legal strategies
to reduce agency authority.100
Relationships with cabinet officers have been an on-going issue in
the Trump Administration.  For instance, Secretary of State Tillerson
only learned about a shift away from a two-state solution in the Middle
East when the shift became public while he was on a flight.101 He was
also publicly at odds with Trump’s position on a dispute between Qatar
and  Saudi  Arabia,  in  which  he  clashed  with  both  Kushner  and
Bannon.102 Frictions rose to the point of angry outbursts by Tillerson
98 Donald  J.  Trump,  Presidential  Executive  Order  on  Reducing  Regulation  and
Controlling  Regulatory  Costs  (Jan.  30,  2017),  available  at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/30/presidential-executive-
order-reducing-regulation-and-controlling. 
99 Presidential  Executive  Order  on  a  Comprehensive  Plan  for  Reorganizing  the
Executive  Branch  (March  13,  2017),  available  at  https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2017/03/13/presidential-executive-order-comprehensive-plan-
reorganizing-executive. 
100 Zeke J.  Miller,  President Trump’s Lawyers Plan a White House Legal Attack on
Federal  Agency  Power,  TIME (March  13,  2017),  available  at
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101 Eli Stools and Josh Dawsey, Trump Ignores ‘the Grown-ups’ in his Cabinet: Foreign
Policy Chiefs Struggle to Influence a Wobbly White House,  POLITICO (Feb. 17, 2017),
available at http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/trump-ignoring-cabinet-235124. 
102 David E. Sanger, Gardiner Harris, and Mark Landler, Where Trump Zigs, Tillerson
Zags, Putting Him at Odds with White House, NY TIMES (June 25, 2017), available at
https://nyti.ms/2u3TgEL.
19
against other White House staff.103 The battles within competing White
House power centers have “helped unify the partially formed Cabinet
into an actual team,” who are “working together, fighting to staff the
agencies they lead and to maximize their collective influence over an
administration struggling to find stability.”104  The President’s  public
attacks on Attorney General Sessions also led to increased concern by
cabinet officers about their own relationships with the White House.105
As a related matter, the public positions taken by these agencies have
not been well coordinated with the White House’s statements.106
Cabinet officers have sometimes seemed to have little influence
on White House decisions even when they have been consulted. They
have faced White House resistance to their staff choices, even in cases
where  they  were  promised  autonomy  or  veto  power.107 Another
indication of the relative weakness of cabinet officers and other agency
heads comes from the budget process.  For instance, despite Pruitt’s
pleas  to  restore  some  EPA  budget  cuts,  the  final  budget  proposal
contained additional cuts instead.108  Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke had
a  similar  experience,  while  Energy  Secretary  Perry  was  on  record
during his confirmation hearings as enthusiastically supporting some
programs  that  were  zeroed  out  of  the  proposed  budget.109 More
surprisingly,  Trump  launched  a  public  campaign  denouncing  his
Attorney General, Jeff Sessions.110
103 See Josh Dawsey, Eliana Johnson and Alex Isenstadt,  Tillerson Blogs Up At Top
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Despite these frictions, Trump has established close relationships
with some agency heads.  In particular, he has frequent meetings with
a handful of favored cabinet members, relying on them for input about
policy  issues.111  In  part,  the motivation  seems to  be his  continued
hostile relations with the bureaucracy, including those within the White
House:
Senior  aides  say  Trump  demands  face  time  with  his
appointees  in  part  because  he  doesn’t  trust  bureaucrats
who do the day-to-day work of the federal government. The
president shuns them as tools of what he often refers to as
the “deep state,” and blames them for frequent, unflattering
news stories coming from his White House, according to two
White House aides.112
Some agency heads are favored over others.  Journalists’ reviews
of White House records revealed that “Pompeo [CIA], Tillerson [State
Department]  and others,  such as Department of  Homeland Security
Secretary John Kelly, are frequent White House visitors, some Cabinet
secretaries  have had little  interaction  with  Trump,  including  Energy
Secretary Rick Perry, Housing and Urban Development Secretary Ben
Carson  and  Agriculture  Secretary  Sonny  Perdue.”113  But  even  the
favored  agency  heads  pay  a  price,  and  some  aides  fear  that  the
amount of time spent advising Trump cuts into their ability to direct
their agencies and interact with the bureaucracy.114
One distinctive innovation in the Trump Administration was the
placement inside agencies of “political aides” reporting to the White
House.115  These  aides  were  installed  in  at  least  sixteen  agencies,
charged  with  monitoring  the  agency  head’s  adherence  to
administration  policy.116  They reported  to  Rick  Dearborn,  who  is  a
White House deputy chief of staff (and therefore in the Priebus sphere
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/344165-timeline-how-the-trump-and-
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of influence).117  In some agencies, these White House agents seemed
to be fitting in; in others, they were a source of friction with high-level
agency officials.118
The use of “political aides” posed other management challenges.
They  provide  disgruntled  agency  staff  with  a  channel  of
communicating directly with the White House, doing an end-run around
the agency head. Correspondingly, control of the information reaching
the  political  aide  is  a  necessary  concern  for  agency  heads.  Not
surprisingly, observers spoke of an escalating battle between cabinet
secretaries  and  their  staff  versus  the  White  House  envoys  in  the
agencies.119 By the beginning of May, there were reports that the White
House  was  giving  ground  and  allowing  agency  heads  to  decide
whether or not to keep their White House liaisons.120 
For  those  agency  heads  who  lack  direct  access  to  Trump,
relationships  with  the  White  House  are  also  complicated  by  the
competing power centers within the White House.  Different agency
heads may have affinities with different power centers, particularly as
between the more Establishment Priebus and Kushner, and the anti-
Establishment Bannon.  Because of the existence of multiple points of
entry to the White House, agency heads may need to curry influence
with  one or  more  power  centers,  while  at  the  same time trying  to
manage internal relations within their agencies. Their ability to perform
that task is weakened by evidence that they have little power to shape
policy or even their agency budgets.
It must be an unusual White House where the West Wing operates
in perfect harmony with smoothly coordinated communications to the
rest of the Executive Branch, and agency heads work seamlessly with
the bureaucracy.  If the emerging picture under Trump is unusual, it is
only because normal management issues appear to be amplified.  
Two important caveats need to be kept in mind.  First, some of the
issues described here may be transitional. As the President and his top
advisors adjust to the governance problems they confront, they may
move  toward  a  more  structured  operation.   Given  that  Trump’s
management style has remained similar over many years, however, it
116 Id.
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is hard to know how likely a coherent structure will evolve.  At least
some of the problems may involve the unusual role played by family
members, and it is hard to see how any chief of staff could hope to
limit family influence or direct access to the President. 
Second,  some  problems  conceivably  may  be  less  severe  than
public reports indicate. They are based on information from insiders, all
of  whom have  their  own  agendas.   Reporters  may  have  a  natural
tendency to exaggerate problems for dramatic effect.  Yet, many of the
reports  seem to  be  from experienced  observers  with  knowledge  of
multiple  presidential  administrations,  suggesting  that  the  Trump
Administration’s management strategy (and resulting problems) were
truly  unusual—even  before  the  mid-May  appointment  of  a  special
counsel  to  investigation  potential  collusion  between  the  Trump
campaign and Russia.121 With widespread reports that Trump himself
was under investigation for obstruction of justice, White House staff
were  under  pressure  to  obtain  independent  legal  representation.122
Combined  with  concerns  about  Trump’s  management  style,  the
investigation was reportedly interfering substantially with recruitment
of Republicans for political appointments within the White House and
agencies.123
121 Acting Attorney General Rod K. Rosenstein, Office of The Attorney General: Order
No. 3915-2017 Appointment of Special Counsel To Investigate Russian Interference
with the 2016 Presidential Election And Related Matters (May 17, 2017).
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Trump’s  firing  of  FBI  Director  James  B.  Comey last  month  and  the
escalating probe into Russian interference in the presidential election
have made hiring even more difficult, say former federal officials, party
activists,  lobbyists and candidates who Trump officials have tried to
recruit.
Republicans say they are turning down job offers to work for a chief
executive whose volatile temperament makes them nervous. They are
asking  head-hunters  if  their  reputations  could  suffer  permanent
damage, according to 27 people The Washington Post  interviewed to
assess  what  is  becoming  a  debilitating  factor  in  recruiting  political
appointees.
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It  would  not  be  a  complete  exaggeration  to  say  that  the  only
stable  aspect  of  the  White  House’s  organization  is  the  President’s
position  at  the  center.  But  Trump’s  own  policy  positions  can  shift
rapidly,  making it  hard for agencies to rely on his expressed views.
One  report  points  to  a  forty-eight-hour  period  during  which  the
President  changed  his  mind  on  a  host  of  issues,  including  such
important  matters  as  strategies  toward  North  Korea,  the  value  of
NATO, whether to use military force in Syria, and the benefits of the
Export-Import Bank.124 Two months later, in the course of twenty-four
hours,  he  first  advocated  complete  repeal  of  a  major  healthcare
statute,  then said he would allow the statute to collapse of  its own
weight without congressional action, and then demanded that Senators
remain in town until they had agreed on a replacement for the law.125
Under  these  circumstances,  it  is  difficult  for  agencies  to  rely  with
confidence  on  presidential  statements  as  a  guide  to  day-to-day
decision-making.
This  is  a  very  different  picture  than  the  one  Kagan  and  other
advocates of expanded Presidential power have painted.  In the next
section  we  look  more  carefully  at  Kagan’s  view,  which  was  based
largely on the Clinton Administration, and how her analysis compares
to the current Administration.
III.   Rethinking Assumptions About the Operation of  the
Presidency
Kagan  viewed  the  Clinton  Administration  as  the  time  when
“presidential control of administration . . . expanded dramatically.”126
Faced with a hostile Congress, Clinton “turned to the bureaucracy” to
achieve  his  foreign  policy  goals.127 In  so  doing,  Clinton  set  the
administrative agenda and shaped the regulatory output.128
Like Trump, Clinton’s approach stressed the President’s power to
command public attention:
Clinton regularly issued formal directives to the heads of
executive  agencies  to  set  the  terms  of  administrative
124 Jill  Colvin,  Why  is  Trump  Changing  His  Mind?,  U.S.  News  (April  14,  2017)
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action  and  prevent  deviation  from  his  proposed  course.
And at the back end of the process . . . Clinton personally
appropriated  significant  regulatory  action  through
communicative  strategies  that  presented  regulation  and
other agency work product . . . as his own, in a way new to
the annals of administrative process.129
Kagan gives several examples of this technique. In one notable
example, Clinton spoke “before there was any proposal to speak of.”130
In a commencement address, he announced a new federal program for
paid parental leave.131 Later, at the beginning of the formal comment
period for the proposed rule, he “spoke of the plan . . . as essentially
consummated.”132 Still later, review of the draft rule by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), he used a radio speech to announce
the final regulation.133 
As Kagan pointed out, unlike President Reagan’s executive orders
on cost-benefit analysis, Clinton’s executive implicitly suggested that
the President had ultimate power to direct an agency’s  rule-making
decisions.134 Although it  did not  directly  assert  such a power,  it  did
require that disputes between an agency and OMB be resolved at the
presidential level.135 Asserting the power of a presidential directive to
displace an agency’s preferences was for Clinton “to say something
significant about the nature of the relationship between the agencies
and the President – to say that they were  his and so to were their
decisions.”136 His  directives,  issued prior  to the formal  White  House
review  by  OIRA,  were  “Clinton’s  primary  means,  self-consciously
undertaken,  both of  setting an administrative agenda that  reflected
and advanced his policy and political preferences and of ensuring the
execution  of  this  program.”137 The  ability  to  shape  administrative
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action this way was not, however, unlimited, since agency resistance
or criticism of a directive could be politically costly.138 
In his second term, Kagan says, “[i]n speech after speech, Clinton
claimed ownership of administrative actions, presenting them to the
public  as  his  own –  as  the  product  of  his  values  and decisions.”139
Meanwhile, his “appropriation of regulatory action, even when wholly
post hoc, sent a loud and lingering message: these were his agencies,
he was responsible for their actions; and  he was due credit for their
successes” – an unmistakable message to those in the Executive Office
of the President and the agencies.140 
As Kagan points out, such activities raise public expectations that
agency actions will reflect presidential policies, and thereby increase
the  pressure  on  presidents  to  exert  effective  influence  over
agencies.141 Kagan viewed this as a new and desirable development in
the  long  story  of  conflict  between  presidents  and  the  federal
bureaucracy.142 This expansion of presidential power was all the more
appealing  for  presidents,  she  argued,  given  that  “the  possibility  of
significant legislative accomplishment . . . has grown dim in an era of
divided  government  with  high  polarization  between  congressional
parties.”143
Kagan’s emphasis on presidential administration has continued to
find support among legal scholars.  Writing in 2016, Cary Coglianese
and  Kristin  Firth  highlighted  presidential  control  of  administration
during the Obama Administration.144  White House directives dictated
agency decisions on issues such as major pollution standards, health
care  implementation,  and  immigration  enforcement.145  As  they
observed, recent presidents of both parties “have publicly proclaimed
their authority to direct the administration of the federal government,”
eight years.  Id. at 2294.
138 Id. at 2298.
139 Id. at 2300.
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with  George  W.  Bush  famously  calling  himself  “the  decider”  and
Obama  saying,  “I’ve  got  a  pen  to  take  executive  actions  where
Congress won’t.”146  
One reasons for presidents to take stronger control is the prospect
that  they will  in  any event  be “held politically  accountable for  how
agencies exercise their vast administrative powers.”147 Coglianese and
Firth’s empirical study found that members of the public gave credit to
presidents  for  successful  regulatory  decisions  but  were  even  more
strongly  inclined  to  blame  presidents  for  bad  decisions.148 Avoiding
such  blame  could  provide  an  additional  motive  for  presidents  to
exercise control over agency decision, even if the president was not
otherwise inclined to do so. It is easy to envision a feedback cycle in
which presidents take control of major agency decisions, fortifying the
public’s  tendency  to  assign  blame  to  the  president  for  unpopular
outcomes, which in turn strengthens the pressure on the president to
assert control.
The  directive  power  has  its  strengths  as  well  as  its  limits.  In
assessing the use of presidential directives, David Barron argued that
the power to direct “can be constantly shaped and tweaked on a case-
by-case  basis  so  as  to  ensure  that,  as  a  whole,  the  strategy  well-
reflects  the  particular  policy  desires  of  the  President  at  a  given
moment.”149 Thus, he said, “[i]ts ad hoc quality is its virtue.”150  But, he
suggested, this power is limited in its application because it  is  “too
limited, too weak, too small bore to amount to much.”151 He noted that
“such directives seem more likely to be a limited tool for making some
incremental policy advances in the face of legislative gridlock.”152
Appointments  are  another  mechanism for  presidents  to  control
the Executive Branch, and a potentially very potent one. Barron argued
that  recent  presidents  “have  been  making  aggressive  use  of  their
146 Id. at 1875. For a more comprehensive description of Obama’s use of presidential
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powers of appointment to remake agencies in their own images.”153 He
pointed  to  the  large  number  of  political  appointments  in  agencies,
especially  those  that  do  not  require  Senate  confirmation,  which
presidents can and do fill with people who share their own regulatory
vision.154  This provides a cadre of presidential loyalists who can not
only ride herd on the civil servants but who can also keep an eye on
the  higher-level  political  appointees,  who  may  sometimes  be  less
aligned  with  the  president  due  to  the  need  to  satisfy   Senatorial
preferences.155
An additional mechanism of control that is well discussed in the
law review literature is  centralized review of  agency actions  by the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB).  This review clearly allows the White
House  as  an  institution  to  exercise  more  power  over  regulatory
matters.   As  discussed in  the Introduction,  Presidents  Bush (2)  and
Trump both made heavy use of this method of control.
There is considerable dispute about the relative strength of these
different mechanisms for presidential control. Barron argued that OMB
may  not  be  easily  amenable  to  presidential  influence,  however,
because  it  is  a  technocratic  organization,  largely  staffed  by  civil
servants, and dedicated to the goal of minimizing regulatory costs.156
This was one reason for Barron’s emphasis on the appointments power
as a mechanism of control. In contrast, political scientists Terry Moe
and Scott Wilson argued that appointments power has limits as a way
to control agencies: because political appointees “need the support of
agency personnel to do their jobs well, appointees are under pressure
to become advocates for the parochial interests of their agencies” and
will inevitably develop different policy agendas as decision-making is
fragmented over multiple entities.157 For that reason, they place more
emphasis  on  presidential  control  via  White  House  centralization  of
authority in entities like OIRA and the National Security Council.158
Despite  these  disputes  over  relative  effectiveness,  there  does
seem  to  be  general  agreement  about  the  primary  instruments
available  to  presidents  in  order  control  decision-making  in  the
executive  branch.   Trump  has  made  vigorous  use  of  the  directive
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power.  Two notable examples are executive directives to reconsider
major Obama-era environmental rules dealing with wetlands protection
and  climate  change,  including  strong  hints  as  to  the  direction  the
reconsideration should take.159
IV.   [Reassessing  the Costs  and Benefits  of  Presidential
Administration] Reassessing the Costs and Benefits of Theories
of the President
[I  am of two minds here. I do think a normative assessment is
valuable.  For  that,  I  would  shorten  the  Presidential  Administration
material and also add a normative assessment to the added theories in
Part  II.  On  the  other  hand,  the  section  could  be  dropped  as  we
lengthen Part II and Part V.]
[Whoever writes  the theory in  Part  II  should  do the connected
section here.  So you would shorten this to match theory (1) and fold in
the relevant political science stuff. I would do a normative assessment
of  the  classic  political  science  theories  on  personality/vision  driven
leadership (2). For (3), the franchise presidency, I  guess I  would do
that since I am doing the theory part for Part II.]
Kagan  pointed  to  several  advantages  to  presidential
administration. To begin with, she argued, the President’s actions have
far greater accountability than an agency’s.  While bureaucracy is “the
place where exercises of coercive power are most unfathomable and
thus most threatening,” the presidency is the “office peculiarly apt to
exercise power in ways that the public can identify and evaluate.”160
Moreover,  because  of  the  President’s  national  constituency,  “he  is
likely to consider, in setting the direction of administrative policy on an
on-going  basis,  the  preferences  of  the  general  public  rather  than
merely parochial interests.”161  As a unitary actor,  the President can
“act without the indecision and inefficiency that so often characterize
the  behavior  of  collective  entities;”162 while  the  broad  scope  of  his
authority allows him to “synchronize and apply general principles to
agency action in a way that congressional committees, special interest
groups, and bureaucratic experts cannot.”163 
159 See Donald J. Trump, Presidential Executive Order on Restoring the Rule of Law,
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Finally,  the president can provide energy and dynamism to the
regulatory  process.164 Kagan  argued  that  the  general  need  for  a
vigorous executive is especially acute in the administrative context.165
She asserted that “large-scale organizations, left to their own devices,
exhibit  over  time  a  diminished  capacity  to  innovate  and  a
correspondingly greater tendency to do what they have always done in
the  face  of  dramatic  changes  in  needs,  circumstances,  and
priorities.”166  For  that  reason,  she  considered  “torpor  a  defining
feature of administrative agencies.”167
In turning to possible critiques of her position, Kagan argued that
any tendency by Presidents to push past the edges of legality can be
combatted by the courts.168  She also argued that the risk of displacing
agency expertise is overblown by critics, although she admitted this
was  possible.169  Her  solution  was  to  suggest  that  presidential
administration  “operate  with  an  attitude  of  respect  toward  agency
experts and with a set of processes that encourage consultation,” and
that presidents should hesitate to intervene “in areas of administration
in  which  professional  knowledge  has  a  particularly  significant  and
needed function,”  such as  “regulatory  action  that  in  large measure
depends on scientific methodology and conclusions.”170 
In addition to the possible criticisms of presidential administration
discussed by Kagan, Barron raised an additional concern about “the
emergence  of  a  single-minded  regulatory  vision”  in  a  presidential
(2016).  Although  conceding  the  descriptive  accuracy  of  Kagan’s  account  of  the
expanding  presidential  role,  she  suggests  that  rather  than  adding  energy  to  the
regulatory system, presidents at least as often obstruct the efforts of agencies to get
things  done.   Id.  at  60.   She  also  questions  whether  presidential  involvement
increases accountability. In her experience as an Assistant Administrator at EPA, she
found that many White House actions were taken under the radar with little public
visibility, often at the behest of industry.  Id. at 60-63.
164 Kagan, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 2351.
165 Id. at 2343.
166 Id. at 2344.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 2349-50. Bruce Ackerman has emphasized the risk that the president “will
be tempted to achieve his objectives by politicizing the administration of whatever-
laws-happen-to-be-on-the-books.”  Bruce Ackerman,  The New Separation of Powers,
113  HARV. L. REV. 633, 712 (2000). Ackerman continues, “To be sure, an impartial
reading of these statutes might imply that his initiative falls far beyond the limits of
legal authority; but with his political partisans in charge of the administration, why
shouldn't the president encourage them to bend the law to fulfill the administration's
program?” Id.
169 Kagan, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 2352-2355.
170 Id. at 2356.
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administration.  His concern was that “such regulatory myopia can be
a  substantial  impediment  to  social  learning  –  a  capacity  that  the
administrative system . . . was surely meant to facilitate through its
celebration of the autonomous, administrative perspective.”171
As  Kagan  observed,  “[f]uture  developments  in  the  relationship
between the President and the agencies may suggest different judicial
responses;  the  practice  of  presidential  control  over  administration
likely will  continue to evolve in ways that raise new issues and cast
doubt on old conclusions.”172 In this regard, the Trump Administration
provides an important new set of data points. 
President Trump’s record to date raises some serious concerns in
terms of a number of the issues discussed by Kagan. It is too soon to
make generalizations about the legality of his actions.  He soon after
taking  office  encountered  serious  judicial  resistance  to  his  orders
blocking U.S. entry of citizens from certain Muslim countries, based on
evidence  of  discriminatory  intent  from  his  own  social  media
declarations.173 Moreover, Trump has a clear history of attacks on the
federal judiciary in connection with pending cases.  For instance, when
a lower court judge issued a temporary stay of his immigration order,
Trump denigrated him on Twitter as a “so-called judge” and said the
ruling  “essentially  takes law-enforcement  away from our country,  is
ridiculous and will be overturned!”174 He followed up by saying: “Just
cannot  believe  a  judge  would  put  our  country  in  such  peril.  If
something happens blame him and court system. People pouring in.
Bad!”175 Such comments were sufficiently unusual to prompt his own
nominee  for  the  Supreme Court,  Neil  Gorsuch,  to  refer  to  them as
“disheartening” and “wrong.”176 Violations of the normal conventions
for  presidential  decorum  toward  the  courts  are  not  proof  of  a
propensity  toward  lawless  behavior.177 But  they  are  indicative  of  a
general lack of respect toward the legal system.
171 Barron, supra note135, at 1121.
172  Kagan, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 2385.
173 The order was temporarily enjoined in Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 
WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017), motion for stay of district court denied, Trump v. 
Washington,  847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017)  . 
174 Brian Bennett,  Trump Attacks  Federal  Judges in Unusually  Personal  Terms, LA
TIMES (Feb. 28 2017), available at 
 http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-travel-ban-20170208-story.html. 
175 Id.
176 Abby Phillip,  Robert  Barnes and Ed O'Keefe,  Supreme Court  Nominee Gorsuch
Says  Trump’s  Attacks  on Judiciary  are ‘Demoralizing’,  WASH.  POST (Feb.  9,  2017),
available  at  https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-nominee-
gorsuch-says-trumps-attacks-on-judiciary-are-demoralizing/2017/02/08/64e03fe2-
ee3f-11e6-9662-6eedf1627882_story.html?utm_term=.4b45b2355cac. 
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In turn, courts have raised serious concerns about Trump’s lack of
adherence to legal  norms.  In reviewing his  executive orders to halt
immigration from designated countries, the lower courts cast doubt on
his  invocation  of  national  security  as  a  basis  for  the  orders.  In
International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump,178 the Fourth Circuit
concluded that the actions were motivated by religious animus toward
Muslims  and  consequently  violated  the  Establishment  Clause.   The
court quoted extensively from Trump’s statements as a candidate and
from statements by himself and his advisors after he took office.179 The
Ninth Circuit took a different tack in  Hawaii v. Trump,180 holding that
the orders  were defective because Trump had failed to articulate a
bona fide national security justification for his sweeping action.  What
the Supreme Court will make of all this is unclear, given that it stayed
part of the lower court orders but allowed them to stand to the extent
they applied to individuals with significant ties to the U.S.181
Kagan viewed President  Clinton’s  deference  to  agency staff on
scientific  matters  as  a  significant  factor  in  ameliorating  potential
problems with presidential administration. In contrast, there are clear
reasons for concern about Trump’s respect for expertise, whether in
agencies or elsewhere.182 For instance, his team of economic advisors
is notably lacking in professional economists.183 Science also seems to
receive  short  shrift  in  the  administration.  Trump  moved  extremely
slowly  on  appointments  to  key  scientific  positions  within  the
Administration, and apparently sought no scientific advice before his
dramatic  decision  to  exit  from  the  Paris  Agreement  on  climate
177 On  the  extent  to  which  Trump’s  behavior  was  unusual,  see  Nina  Totenberg,
Trump's Criticism Of Judges Out Of Line With Past Presidents,  NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO
(Feb.  11,  2017),  available  at  http://www.npr.org/2017/02/11/514587731/trumps-
criticism-of-judges-out-of-line-with-past-presidents. 
178 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017)(en banc), cert. granted 137 S. Ct.  2080 (2017).
179 Id. at  --. [pagination not yet available]
180 Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted 137 S. Ct. 2080 
(2017).
181 Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017)
182 For a broad survey of the administration’s attitude toward expertise, see James
Hohmann, No Relevant Experience? It’s Not a Problem for Trump, WASH. POST (July 24,
2017),  available  at  https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/daily-
202/2017/07/24/daily-202-trump-marginalizes-experts-debases-expertise/
597548fc30fb043679543214/?
utm_term=.158c3b1ec01d&wpisrc=nl_daily202&wpmm=. 
183 Justin Wolfers, Why Most Economists Are So Worried About Trump, NY TIMES (Jan.
11,  2017)  (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/upshot/why-most-economists-are-
so-worried-about-trump.html. 
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change.184 Within  the White House staff, many positions  for  science
and technology advisors are vacant, and the few appointees do not
regularly  participate  in  his  briefings.185  In  another  sign  of  the
Administration’s distant relationship with the scientific community, the
budget proposal he sent to Congress in 2017 included massive cuts to
scientific and medical research.186
To  the  extent  that  agency  science  is  supposed  to  reach  the
president  via  agency  heads,  that  channel  may  also  be  sluggish  or
blocked.  For  instance,  EPA Administrator  Scott  Pruitt  has  reportedly
relied more heavily on industry lobbyists than on EPA staff in making
decisions.   Rather  then  obtaining  expert  input  from  staff,  he  “has
outsourced crucial work to a network of lawyers, lobbyists, and other
allies,  especially  Republican  state  attorneys  general.”187 In  agencies
across the administration, deregulation teams have been assigned to
184 Chris Mooney, 85 Percent of the Top Science Jobs in Trump’s Government Don’t
Even  Have  a  Nominee, WASH.  POST (June  7,  2016),  available  at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/06/06/trump-
has-filled-just-15-percent-of-the-governments-top-science-jobs/?
utm_term=.881d54885228. 
185 Cecilia Kang and Michael D. Shear, Trump Leaves Science Jobs Vacant, Troubling
Critics, NY Times (March 30, 2017), available at https://nyti.ms/2oBjfkh.  Even in July,
the White House Office of Science and Technology had only a third of the staff it had
in  the  Obama  Administration,  and  the  science  division  appears  to  have  had  no
remaining staff. See Christa Marshall,  Science Office a Shadow of Its Former Staff,
E&E News (July 3, 2017), available at https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060056920. 
186 Joel Achenbach and Lena H. Sun, Trump Budget Seeks Huge Cuts to Science and
Medical  Research,  Disease  Prevention,  WASH.  POST (May  23,  2017),  available  at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2017/05/22/trump-budget-
seeks-huge-cuts-to-disease-prevention-and-medical-research-departments/?
utm_term=.848e19c348e0. 
187 Coral Davenport,  Counseled by Industry, Not Staff, EPA Chief is Off to a Blazing
Start,  NY  TIMES  (July  1,  2017),  available  at  https://nyti.ms/2uwXByi.  Pruitt  and
Education Secretary Betsy DeVos seem to be the most extreme cases, but some
other  cabinet-level  appointees  are  also  estranged  from  staff  because  of  the
appointee’s hostility to their agency’s missions.  See Juliet Eilperin and Emma Brown,
Cabinet  Secretaries’  Tough  Task:  Lack  of  Funding,  Support  for  Agency  Missions,
WASH.  POST.  (July  2,  2017),  available  at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/cabinet-secretaries-tough-task-lack-of-
funding-support-for-agency-missions/2017/07/02/d17279ee-4ad9-11e7-a186-
60c031eab644_story.html?utm_term=.5ed58fac56ed.  The  schism  between  agency
staff and the political appointees extends below Pruitt’s level.  For example, agency
experts  were  dismayed  when  new  rules  governing  the  chemical  industry  were
shaped by a deputy assistant  who had been a lobbyist  for the industry  until  her
appointment. Annie Snider, EPA Staffers, Trump Official Clashed Over New Chemical
Rules,  POLITICO  (June  22,  2017),  available  at
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/22/trump-epa-energy-chemicals-clash-239875.
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identify regulations for repeal; political appointees from industry and
its allies are the dominant voices on these teams.188
The  description  of  the  Trump  White  House  in  Part  I  raises
questions about the extent to which the potential positive benefits of
presidential administration will be realized.  Rampant conflict among
presidential  advisors,  leading to  ad hoc  decisions  by  the  President,
does not seem conducive to the creation of clear, uniform policies.  In
cases  where  the  President  does  not  ultimately  settle  a  dispute,
conflicting messages from White House staff may leave agencies at a
loss  for  how  to  proceed.   Although  Trump’s  use  of  social  and
conventional  media  may  make  it  easier  for  the  public  to  attribute
actions  to  him,  they  can  also  be  a  source  of  confusion,  thereby
diminishing  accountability.  For  instance,  in  the  litigation  over  his
second  travel  ban,  he  publicly  blamed  its  more  limited  nature
(compared with his first ban) on the Justice Department, eliding the
fact that it was an executive order that he himself had signed.189
Trump’s unusual political style and his management style might
tempt one to consider him to be an outlier  in terms of presidential
administration.  But his approach to administration can be seen as a
continuation of the methods identified by Kagan in her article by which
a president  can control  executive branch policy  through  the use of
publicity  and  instructions  to  agencies  and  can  seize  credit  for
administrative actions as his own. Trump is also using other methods,
such as centralized review by OIRA and use of  social  media,  which
previous presidents  had honed.  But  some of  the potential  concerns
noted  by  Kagan  have  materialized  in  force,  such  as  disregard  for
scientific expertise and questionable allegiance to the rule of law.  
As  we  have  seen,  those  issues  too  have  arisen  under  prior
presidents,  though  not  to  the  same  degree.   In  short,  the  Trump
Administration does not seem to be entirely sui generis. Still, some of
the  issues  under  Trump  do  seem  notably  more  severe  than  his
predecessors.   Thus, in degree if  not in kind,  he may differ notably
from his predecessors.  Nevertheless, even if Trump is an exceptional
case, rules must be designed with exceptional cases in mind as well as
typical ones.  After all, Trump is one of only three presidents to serve
since  Kagan’s  article  proclaimed  the  emergence  of  presidential
administration, a not insignificant proportion, and we have no way of
188 Danielle  Ivory  and  Robert  Paturechi,  The  Deep  Industry  Ties  of  Trump’s
Deregulation  Teams,  NY  TIMES (July  11,  2017),  available  at
https://nytu.com.ms/2v6AHAb. 
189 Trump tweeted: "The Justice Dept.  should have stayed with the original  travel
ban,  not  the  watered  down,  politically  correct  version  they  submitted  to  S.C.
[Supreme Court]." Mica Rosenberg and Andrew Chung, Trump complicates travel ban
case by grumbling at Justice Department, REUTERS (June 5, 2017), available at https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-security-usa-trump-idUSKBN18W1BR. 
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knowing whether he will turn out to be unusual or the norm compared
with his successors.  
More  fundamental  is  the  need  to  calibrate  doctrine  to  take
advantage  of  the  strengths  of  the  executive  branch  and  of  the
President,  while  also  taking  into  account  the  risks  that  attend
executive  discretion.   Those  risks  seem  to  be  greater  than  Kagan
anticipated when she made her case for presidential administration.  It
would be an overreaction to call for radical rethinking of current law
based on a single presidency. But, so too, would it be wrong to ignore a
President  who  illustrates  some  of  the  pitfalls  of  presidential
administration.
V.  Implications for Administrative Law
[I  would  restructure:  A:  Personnel;  B:  Process;  C:  Substance.
Under A, I would place appointments (including hiring/firing, rivals, and
actings) and the directive power. Under B, I would talk about the role
of OIRA and how notice and comment might seem attractive (needed
to repeal Obama era rules and to give more permanence). In addition,
there  could  be  mention  of  the  Administration’s  repeals  of  policy
statements. Title IX and DACA seem like relevant examples. Finally, it
seems like the presumption of regularity should get some discussion.
Under  C,  I  would  place  the  deference  material  below  (both  about
factors outside the statutory framework due to EO 13771 and other
administration  priorities  as  well  as  about  changes  in  policy  (Fox
Television)).  The  second  part  of  C  obviously  ties  to  the  process
discussion in B. In all three subparts, there would need to be ties to the
three theories in Part II.]
[I would propose that I add in the appointments material and you
cut down the directive power material in A. I could do B and you would
revise slightly C.]
The case for presidential administration seems decidedly less powerful
than it may have seemed when Kagan wrote her analysis. This section
will  consider  the  relevance  of  these  developments  for  some  long-
standing issues in administrative law.
A.  The Scope of Directive Power
It is clear that, as a general rule,190 a president can remove an
executive official who fails to follow his directions, even when a matter
has been assigned to that official by Congress. As a practical matter,
190 The primary exceptions being the heads of independent agencies. The leading
case on the scope of presidential removal power is Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654
(1988), in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute (since repealed)
establishing an independent prosecutor to investigate crimes within the executive
branch. Justice Scalia, a believer in the unitary executive, filed a strong dissent.  See
id. at 697-734.
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that  provides  a  strong  incentive  for  officials  to  comply.  There  is
considerable dispute,  however,  over whether the official  has a legal
duty to comply or else resign, rather than forcing the president to fire
the official.  Given that the President may be unwilling for political or
other reasons to fire an official, the difference sometimes has practical
significance. 
Advocates  of  the  unitary  executive  have  argued  that  the
Constitution resolves this dispute in favor of the President, and in fact
that a statute purporting to place the final decision in the hands of the
agency official would be unconstitutional.191  This argument is largely
based  on  the  vesting  clause  of  the  Constitution,  which  reposes
executive power in the President. 192  
Peter Strauss has marshaled the arguments on the other side of
this constitutional issue. 193  There are other clauses of the Constitution
that seem to point in the opposite direction. The “take care” clause, for
instance, imposes a duty on the President to “take care that the laws
be  faithfully  executed,”  not  a  duty  to  execute  the  laws  faithfully
191 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi and Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to
Execute the Laws, 104  YALE L.J. 541, 549-550 (1994). In their view,  “[t]he Framers
and  ratifiers  consciously  and  deliberately  chose  to  put  one  person  in  charge  of
executing all federal laws.”  Id. at 664.
192 Lessig and Sunstein vigorously dispute this view of the original understanding:
We think that the view that the framers constitutionalized anything like
this vision of the executive is just plain myth. It is a creation of the
twentieth  century,  not  the  eighteenth.  It  derives  from  twentieth
century  categories  applied  unreflectively  to  an  eighteenth  century
document. It ignores strong evidence that the framers imagined not a
clear executive hierarchy with the President at the summit, but a large
degree of  congressional  power  to  structure  the  administration  as  it
thought proper.
Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM.
L.  REV. 1,  2-3  (1996).   Their  analysis  of  the  Framer’s  view  about  presidential
directives is starkly different than that of the unitary executive scholars.  See id. 5-
83.  Although  they  do  not  agree  that  the  Framers  specifically  understood  the
Constitution to give the President the directive power, they adopt a novel alternative
argument.  They argue that  in present day circumstances,  although not  when the
Constitution was adopted, the best way to implement the Framers’ general concept
of separation of powers is to give the President directive power. Id. at 104.  This
argument  is  an  unusual  mix  of  originalism  (as  to  the  general  concept  of  the
presidential  function)  and  a  “living  Constitution”  view  that  the  Framers’  goals
requires different constitutional doctrines at different times.  The experience of the
Trump Administration may pose as much of a problem for the functionalist side of
their argument as it does for Kagan’s functional analysis of presidential power.
193 Peter  L.  Strauss,  Foreword:  Overseer,  or  “The  Decider”?  The  President  in
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007).  Strauss points to a history of
disputes  about  this  issue  even  among  Attorney  Generals,  who  are  of  course
presidential appointees.  Id. at 697-699.
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himself, while the “necessary and proper” clause speaks of   “powers
vested” in the Government of the United States, or in any Department
or  Officer  thereof,”  which  suggests  strongly  that  departments  and
officers do have their own authority, rather than merely be conduits for
presidential  action.  But  the  debate  over  these  matters  is  far  too
complex to address here.
In any event, Kagan eschewed reliance on the unitary executive
theory in her argument for giving the President broad power to direct
the actions of executive officers.  Unlike unitary executive theorists,
she  conceded  that  Congress  could  grant  the  power  to  make  final
decisions in other officials. But she argued on policy grounds that the
President  should  have the power  to  direct  the actions  of  executive
branch officials unless a statute clearly requires otherwise.  The policy
reasons  in  question  were  the  benefits  she  saw  in  presidential
administration.194
 Responding  to  Kagan,  Kevin  Stack  argued  that  Kagan’s
presumption  in  favor  of  directive  authority  ignored  congressional
practice.195  He identified many statutes in which Congress specifically
gave the President directive power or final power of decision.196  That
indicated, he contended, that Congress did not write statutes on the
assumption that silence on this issue implied the existence of directive
power.197  If  anything,  he  argued,  Congress  seemed to  assume the
contrary.198
Not  everyone  agreed  with  Kagan  on  policy  grounds.   Peter
Strauss argued that directive power “appears rather as a threat to the
engine  of  practical  checks  and  balances  that,  for  more  than  two
centuries,  has  helped  keep  American  Government  on  a  democratic
track.”199 Lisa Heinzerling, based on her administrative experience at
EPA,  has  a  very  different  assessment  of  presidential  administration
than Kagan’s. In her view, “[t]he system that we have does not, in the
run of cases, lead to the kind of energetic and accountable action that
194 A similar position was earlier taken by other scholars.  See  Lessig and Sunstein,
supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 2-3. 
195 Kevin M. Stack,  The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer  the Laws,  106
COLUM. L. REV.  263 (2006).
196 Id. at 276-283.
197 Id. at 284-291. 
198 Robert Percival also points to the language of the executive orders from Reagan
and later presidents directing agencies to perform cost-benefit analysis, which seems
to concede that the final decision on regulations resides with the agencies rather
than the White House. Percival,  supra note  Error:  Reference source not found, at
2487.
199 Strauss, supra note 192, at 757.
37
Justice Kagan described.”200  “In many cases,” Heinzerling wrote with
particular reference to the role of OIRA, “it instead leads to stasis and
failure of accountability.”201 
Experience  thus  far  with  the  Trump  Administration  reinforces
concerns about expanding the president’s power to force decisions on
unwilling agencies..  Accepting Kagan’s approach would increase the
likelihood that decisions would be made without regard to the views of
experts.  Given the chaotic situation within the White House and the
President’s  propensity  for  changing  his  mind,  recognizing  directive
power would seem unlikely to increase the consistency or coherence of
government regulations or to rest on careful adherence to statutory
mandates.  The  Trump  track  record  in  the  White  House  does  not
provide a knockdown argument against Kagan’s position, but it does
add considerable weight to the cautionary notes about the directive
power sounded by Strauss and others.  
Kagan  may be right  that  under  some presidents  an  expansive
view  of  the  directive  power  would  provide  stronger  government
without undermining the important role of expertise and adherence to
the rule of law.  But with some other presidents, such as Trump, this
perspective may be too optimistic.  
It seems a large gamble to give any one individual the power to
decide by fiat how the enormous power of the federal government will
be deployed across the full range of decisions from surveillance and
criminal  prosecution  of  individuals  to regulation  of  entire  industries.
Allowing dissenting officials the option to force the president’s hand, by
requiring  him to either  accede to  their  decisions  or  fire them, may
provide at least on the margins some check on abuse of power.  Yet
this modest check can hardly be viewed as destroying the ability of the
president to maintain the unity of the executive branch.
B.   Presidential Administration and Judicial Deference
The  Supreme  Court  has  grappled  with,  but  not  conclusively
resolved, whether the president’s support for a policy should count in
favor  of  the  policy  during  judicial  review.   Most  famously,  in  the
Chevron case,  the  Court  grounded  deference  to  agency  statutory
interpretations  on  two  considerations:   Congress’s  delegation  of
authority  to  the  agency  and  the  greater  political  accountability  of
agencies as compared with courts.   But later cases have tended to
place greater stress on the delegation argument.
In two other cases, the Court considered changes in agency policy
that were clearly prompted by changes in presidential administrations.
200 Heinzerling, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 65.
201 Id.
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State Farm involved the Reagan Administration’s decision to rescind an
earlier regulation requiring air bags or passive restraints in new cars.202
The  majority  held  that  the  agency’s  decision  was  arbitrary  and
capricious  because it  had failed  to  provide  an adequately  reasoned
justification for its action.   In dissent, then-Justice Rehnquist  argued
that  the  difference  in  regulatory  philosophies  of  the  new president
provided a legitimate basis for rethinking the earlier regulation.
More recently, in  Fox Television,203 the Court upheld the decision
of  the FCC to abandon a previous  policy,  under which  it  would  not
penalize “fleeting” use of indecent language by broadcasters.  Justice
Scalia’s opinion for the Court held that the FCC’s change in stance was
not  arbitrary  or  capricious.   In  parts  of  the  opinion,  he  embraced
Rehnquist’s  view  of  the  legitimacy  of  “political”  considerations  in
regulatory  decisions.  But  those  portions  of  the  opinion  represented
only a plurality.
Kagan argued that presidential involvement should be considered
a critical factor in applying the  Chevron doctrine.204 For instance, she
202 Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983). The
Court’s reasoning is encapsulated in the closing section of Justice White’s majority
opinion:
“An agency's view of what is in the public interest may change, either
with or without a change in circumstances. But an agency changing
its  course  must  supply  a  reasoned  analysis  ...”  Greater  Boston
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (CADC), cert. denied, 403
U.S. 923, (1971).
Id. at  57.   In  contrast,  Justice  Rehnquist,  writing  for  himself  and  three  other
dissenters, argued that:
A change in administration brought about by the people casting their
votes  is  a  perfectly  reasonable  basis  for  an  executive  agency's
reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and regulations.
As  long  as  the  agency  remains  within  the  bounds  established  by
Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate
priorities in light of the philosophy of the administration.
Id. at 59.
203 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009). Fox held that an agency
is not as a general matter required to provide a stronger explanation of its decision to
change or rescind a rule than it would have had to provide for a new rule, except
when it is necessary for an agency to explain why its view of the facts has changed
or to take into account reliance interests developed because of the prior rule.  Id. at
515.
204 Chevron U.S.A.,  Inc.  v.  Natural  Resources Defense Council,  Inc.,  467 U.S.  837
(1984), held that when Congress has not spoken clearly to an issue, courts should
defer  to  a  reasonable  agency  interpretation  of  the  governing  statute.   As  Kagan
explained,  this  holding  was  based  partly  on  the  greater  public  accountability  of
agencies  and partly  on the  presumption  that  Congress  intended them to resolve
statutory ambiguities. Kagan, supra note , at 2378.
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said,  “new  administrative  interpretations  following  new  presidential
elections should provide a reason to think deference appropriate rather
than the opposite.”205
Kagan also largely endorsed Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in  State
Farm that  an  agency  should  be  allowed  to  rely  on  the  president’s
preferences in grey areas, provided it did consider “obvious regulatory
alternatives” and did not disregard contrary evidence.206 Other scholars
have debated the question of whether application of the arbitrary and
capricious doctrine should include deference to White House directives
to agencies,207 or whether on the contrary those directives should be
considered to undermine the legitimacy of the agency’s action.208
Lisa  Bressman  has  argued  persuasively  that  arguments  for
presidential  administration  are  rooted  in  the  appeal  of
majoritarianism.209 Bressman  offers  a  strong  normative  critique  of
majoritarianism as  a  basis  for  administrative  legitimacy,  but  in  the
case of President Trump, the majoritarian argument does not even get
off the ground. The fact that the President did not receive the vote of a
majority  of  American voters  is  irrelevant  to the legal  validity  of  his
election, but it does weaken the argument for deference to presidential
views based on the President’s claim to represent the national public.
And here, too, Trump’s case is not wholly unique: President George W.
Bush also failed to win the popular vote in his first election; and Bill
Clinton had only plurality support in his first election.
205 Id. at 2378.
206 Id. at 2381.
207 Kathryn Watts is perhaps the main supporter of Kagan’s position.  See Kathryn A.
Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 Yale L.J.
2 (2009).  She does propose an important caveat that the political influence must be
open and transparent, id. at 8, and she limits her thesis to “those influences that
seek to further policy considerations of public value” as opposed to “those that seek
to implement raw politics or partisan politics unconnected in any way to the statutory
scheme  being  implemented.”  Id.  at  9.  For  a  critique  of  Watts’  position,  see
Seidenfeld, supra note .
208 Christopher Edley has suggested that the legitimacy of the political dimension of
policy making should depend in part on whether diverse political perspectives were
considered in the agency decision process.  Christorpher F. Edley, Jr.,  ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW:  RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 199  (1990).  So  far,  there  is  no
indication that this is taking place in the Trump Administration.
209 In her words,
That  model  places  administrative  policymaking  under  the  direction  of  the
government official who, it is said, is the most responsive to the people.13 The
President represents and answers to a national  constituency,  which makes
him even more responsive to the people as a whole than Congress.
Lisa Schultz  Bressman, Beyond Accountability:  Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 466 (2003). 
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Initial experience with the Trump Administration undermines other
arguments for basing judicial deference on presidential involvement.
Given the detachment of Trump’s White House from agency expertise
and doubts about its adherence to the rule of law, it is hard to see how
the fact that the president supports an action contributes force to the
“reasoned explanation” required by the courts.  How deferential should
courts  be to a President who, after having demanded the repeal  of
legislation structuring much of the healthcare sector for many months,
only belatedly came to the realization that healthcare is a complicated
subject?210
Instead,  one  might  argue  that  presidential  involvement  should
detract from the deference to be accorded to an agency decision.  To
the extent that Chevron deference rests on a delegation by Congress
to an agency, evidence that a decision was made in the White House
seems to undermine the case for deference.  But presidents can hardly
be expected to keep silent about important pending regulatory issues,
and agencies cannot be expected to ignore their views.  Thus, there is
a considerable line-drawing problem in determining when a president
has  had  so  much  influence  on  the  agency’s  decision  that  a  court
should  no longer  give  the  agency’s  decision  the  normal  amount  of
judicial  deference.211 Deference doctrines  are based on assumptions
about the agency – that it was chosen by Congress to implement a law
and that it has special expertise – and these assumptions do not apply
when it is not the agency itself that has actually made the decision.
An  alternative  issue  based  on  presidential  intervention  in  an
agency’s decision would arise when the basis for the White House’s
action would clearly be impermissible under the governing statute.  For
instance, the president might direct the agency to reject a proposed
action  on  the  basis  of  cost,  in  a  situation  where  cost  is  not  a
permissible consideration under the statute. That would be a basis for
invalidating the agency’s decision.212 The communications in question
210 In President Trump’s words:
We have come up with a solution that's really, really I think very good," Trump
said at a meeting of the nation's governors at the White House.
Now, I have to tell you, it's an unbelievably complex subject. Nobody knew
health care could be so complicated.
Kevin Liptak, Trump: 'Nobody knew health care could be so complicated', CNN (Feb.
28,  2017),  available  at http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/27/politics/trump-health-care-
complicated/index.html. 
211 Katherine Shaw,  Beyond the Bully Pulpit:  Presidential Speech in the Courts, 96
TEX. L. REV. – (2017)(forthcoming), is the first systematic exploration of the subject of
which I am aware.   
212 After first holding that cost was not a factor that EPA could consider in setting
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQSs), Justice Scalia went on to say:
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might well be protected by executive privilege, blocking inquiry – but
that  may  not  always  be  true.   For  instance,  a  president  might
announce his views in a tweet or public  statement.  In determining
whether to pursue the issue, the court should take into account the
likelihood  that  the  agency  would  take  the  communication  to  be  a
serious expression of presidential intent, rather than an ill-considered
casual remark.
This is not to say that agency decisions are purely technocratic
exercises.  We all realize, as do courts, that policy is a legitimate part
of  the  decision  making  process,  and  that  approaches  to  policy  are
properly  chosen by  political  appointees.  But  Kagan’s  argument  was
that the simple fact of presidential involvement in a decision should
add to the legitimacy of an agency’s action. That argument was based,
in turn, on assumptions about the operation of the White House and its
relationship  to  agencies  that  have  proved  with  time  to  be  at  best
shaky.
C.  The Checking Function of the Bureaucracy
In Kagan’s article,  the virtues of  presidential  administration are
generally  set  off  against  a  far  less  rosy  view  of  the  bureaucracy,
described  as  having,  at  best,  “somewhat  bloodless,  technocratic
virtues,”213 while  suffering  from “bureaucratic  inertia  in  the  face  of
unmet  needs  and  challenges” 214 and  “inherent  vices  (even
pathologies),  foremost  among which  are inertia  and torpor.”215  But
alternative visions are possible. Jon Michaels argues instead that “the
independent  and  much  relied-upon”  –  he  might  have  added,  much
reviled – “civil service has institutional, cultural, and legal incentives to
insist that agency leaders follow the law, embrace prevailing scientific
understandings, and refrain from partisan excesses.”216
Respondents' speculation that the EPA is secretly considering the costs
of attainment without telling anyone is irrelevant to our interpretive
inquiry. If such an allegation could be proved, it would be grounds for
vacating the NAAQS, because the Administrator had not followed the
law.
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001).
213 Kagan, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 2341.
214 Id. at 2249.
215 Id. at 2263.
216 Jon D. Michaels,  An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
515,  543  (2015).  As  Michaels  explains,  civil  service  rules  and  whistleblower
protection provide bureaucrats a sturdy platform to defend expertise and deliberative
decision making:
Accordingly,  civil  servants  have  broad  responsibilities  and  the  legal
authority  and  institutional  inclination  to  resist  and  redirect  agency
leaders' intent on shortchanging procedures, ignoring or downplaying
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Kagan actually provided very little evidence to support her dour
appraisal  of  the  bureaucracy,  apparently  taking  the  failings  of
bureaucracy  as  a  matter  of  common knowledge.   Her  vision  of  an
abidingly torpid bureaucracy, lacking in the ability to innovate without
a kick from the White House, seems inconsistent with her description
of  how  Clinton  sometimes  claimed  ownership  of  agency  initiatives
rather  than  originating  them.  She  is  surely  right  that  bureaucratic
inertia exists and that the president may play a role in overcoming it.
But  as  Lisa  Heinzerling  has  pointed  out,  presidential  administration
may also be a  source of  inertia,  as bureaucratic  initiatives  become
mired in White House review or are actually vetoed.217 
Moreover, the marginalization of agency expertise in the Trump
Administration  may  provide  a  salutary  reminder  of  how  central
expertise is  to the operation of  government.   Many issues,  not  just
health care, are enormously complicated.  A government that tries to
operate solely on the basis of the leadership’s political instincts without
attending to all the complexity will  almost inevitably commit serious
errors.218
I am not the first to consider the potential checking function of the
bureaucracy.  Neil  Katyal  has  written  about  the  civil  service  in  his
analysis  of  the  internal  checks  and  balances  within  the  executive
branch.219 One of those checks is the independence of the Civil Service
congressional  directives  or  scientific  findings,  or  championing
unvarnished partisan causes. Civil servants' loyalties generally lie with
their  professional  commitments  (as  trained  biologists,  lawyers,
engineers,  etc.),  the programs they advance,  and the  organizations
they  serve. And  their  means  of  advancement  and  validation  come
largely  from within  the  civil  2015  service  itself,  where  expertise  is
prized and political activism is discouraged.
Id. at 544.
217 See Heinzerling, supra note Error: Reference source not found.
218 William Resh presents empirical evidence that institutional competence during the
Bush Administration was tied to development of trust between political employees
and permanent staff. See William G. Resh,  RETHINKING THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY:
TRUST, INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL,  AND APPOINTEE-CAREERIST RELATIONS IN THE GEORGE W. BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 156-158  (2015).   Interestingly,  Resh  suggests  that  the  Obama
Administration was less respectful of senior career professionals as it consolidated
more authority in White House staff.  Id. at 158. If true, this is a trend that seems to
have increased during the Trump Administration.
219 Neal  Kumar  Katyal,  Internal  Separation  Of  Powers:  Checking  Today’s  Most
Dangerous  Branch From Within,  115  YALE L.J.  2314 (2006).   Speaking of  Kagan’s
advocacy of presidential administration, he pointed out that her argument is best
suited for periods of divided government: “[I]t becomes clear that the Kagan thesis
depends  crucially  on  oversight  by  the  coordinate  legislative  branch  (typically
controlled by a party in opposition to the President). Without that checking function,
presidential  administration  can become an engine of  concentrated power.”  Id.  at
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from  direct  political  influence.220 In  his  view,  the  “modest  internal
checking  function  created  by  bureaucratic  overlap  and  civil-service
protections, coupled with reporting requirements, moves the balance
away from the regime of  nearly  pure  presidential  control  toward  a
middle  ground  that  more  closely  approximates  the  separation  of
powers laced into the fabric of our constitutional order.”221 Although his
focus is on Civil Service employees in the national security area, his
point seems valid as applied to government career professionals more
generally.
Bureaucracy may be too prone to inertia, but inertia can also be a
needed check on arbitrary or ill-considered actions.  Katyal points out
that one “chief advantage of bureaucracy is to maintain the long-term
view.”222 As  Jennifer  Nou  observed  even  before  Trump  took  office,
because agency staff are hired on the basis of merit, “they often enter
government  with  professional  norms  informed  by  technical  or  legal
training.”223  Consequently, “they are often professionals disposed to
defend norms such as scientific integrity and the rule of law.”224 
The ultimate decisions are made by political appointees, but the
bureaucracy  can  play  an  important  role  in  pushing  back  against
decisions  that  lack  genuine legal  or  technical  justifications.225 Apart
from making their  voices  heard in  internal  government  discussions,
they have other means to push back, including complaints to agency
inspectors general, press leaks, and communication with Congress.226
2318.
220 5 U.S.C. §§2301-2305 establishes the merit system that protects civil  servants
from political pressure.
221 Id. at 2346.
222 Id. at 2344.
223 Jennifer  Nou,  Resistance  from  Below (Nov.  16,  2016),
http://yalejreg.com/nc/bureaucratic-resistance-from-below-by-jennifer-nou/.
224 Id.   Further support  for this view, from a political  science perspective, can be
found  in  Jack  H.  Knott  and  Gary  J.  Miller,  When  Ambition  Checks  Ambition:
Bureaucratic  Trustees and the Separation of Powers,  38  AM.  REV.  PUB.  ADMIN.  387
(2008).
225 Gillian  Metzger  observed that  opposition  from the civil  service  can also work
against  an  agency  in  terms  of  judicial  review.  See  Gillian  E.  Metzger,  The
Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59
EMORY L.J. 423, 445 (2009).
226 These  and  other  forms  of  resistance  emerged  very  early  in  the  Trump
Administration.  See Juliet Eilperin, Lisa Rein and Marc Fisher, Resistance from within:
Federal workers push back against Trump, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2017), available at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/resistance-from-within-federal-workers-
push-back-against-trump/2017/01/31/c65b110e-e7cb-11e6-b82f-
687d6e6a3e7c_story.html?utm_term=.64759424e90f.  For instance,
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To take one striking example, military lawyers strongly resisted Bush
Administration efforts to limit the hearing rights of detainees.227
The benefits of a bureaucratic voice in decision-making underpin
the importance of what Jody Freeman and Adrian Vermeule have called
expertise forcing by courts.228 In part, this expertise forcing takes the
form of an insistence that a court  justify its decisions based on the
factors relevant under the statute authorizing its actions.229 But it also
involves an anti-circumvention principle, designed to ensure that the
agency  does  not  drain  the  life  from  a  statute’s  basic  policies  for
The  State  Department  has  emerged  as  the  nexus  of  opposition  to
Trump’s  refugee  policy,  in  part  because  it  has  an  official  dissent
channel  where  Foreign  Service  employees  can  register  opposition
without fear of reprisals. The channel, formed in 1971, has been used
to  raise  policy  objections  to  the  Vietnam  War  and  other  conflicts.
Several  hundred  employees  signed  the  dissent  cable  objecting  to
Trump’s refugee policy.
Id.
227 See Victor Hansen,  Understanding the Role of  Military Lawyers in the War on
Terror: A Response to the Perceived Crisis in Civil-Military Relations, 50 S. TEX. L. REV.
617 (2009). In one telling incident, military lawyers went public with their concerns: 
The Pentagon’s top uniformed lawyers took issue Thursday with a key
part of a White House plan to prosecute terrorism detainees, telling
Congress that limiting the suspects’ access to evidence could violate
treaty obligations. Their testimony to a House committee marked the
latest  time  that  military  lawyers  have  publicly  challenged  Bush
administration proposals to keep some evidence — such as classified
information  —  from  accused  terrorists.  In  the  past,  some  military
officials  have  expressed  concerns  that  if  the  U.S.  adopts  such
standards, captured American troops might be treated the same way.
Associated Press,  Military  Lawyers Question Bush Plans for Trials (Sept.  7,  2006),
available  at  http://www.nbcnews.com/id/14717778/ns/us_news-security/t/military-
lawyers-question-bush-plan-trials/#.WXTX6NPyt-U. 
228 See Jody Freeman and Adrian Vermeule,  Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 52-53 (2008).  As they recount,  Massachusetts v.
EPA involved a highly politicized decision by the Bush Administration to ignore the
view of  scientists  and refuse to make a finding that  greenhouse gases endanger
public health and welfare.  Id. at 53-64.  In their view of this and other recent cases,
“the  Court  has  seemingly  turned  away  from  this  benign  view  of  presidential
administration  toward  an  older  model  of  administrative  law that  emphasizes  the
tension  between  democratic  politics—and  in  particular  political  control  over  line
agencies – and technocratic expertise.”  Id. at 71. In their view, “these cases are all
to a greater or lesser extent inflected with a worry about executive willingness to
cast aside expertise and professional methodologies and procedures in the name of
political expediency.”  Id. at 95.
229 Id. at 80.
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ideological reasons.230 Memorably, they call Massachusetts v. EPA,231 in
which  the  Court  overturned  the  Bush  Administration’s  decision  to
refrain from regulating greenhouse gases, as “State Farm  for a new
generation”232 –  State  Farm  being  a  foundational  case  demanding
reasoned explanation of an agency’s decisions based on the evidence
in  the  record.233  The  decision-making  processes  of  the  Trump
Administration, which I described in detail in Part I(A), make it all the
more important for courts to exercise the kind of “hard look” review
defined by State Farm.234
I do not want to overstate either the extent of the Kagan article’s
embrace  of  presidential  activism  or  the  significance  of  Trump  in
thinking  more  generally  about  the  role  of  the  president  in  our
administrative  state.   Kagan  was  careful  to  acknowledge  “the
continuing roles that Congress, bureaucratic experts, and constituency
groups  play  in  administrative  governance”  and  “the  need  for  the
continued  participation  of  these actors,  in  various  contexts  and  for
various  purposes.”235 She  was  calling  for  a  substantial  shift  of  the
balance toward presidential control, not the complete substitution of
politics for expertise.  Likewise, based on the Trump experience, I have
argued for increasing the voice of the bureaucracy, not the elimination
of  presidential  control  in  setting  priorities  and  coordinating  efforts
among different agencies.
230 Id. at 87.  Although she is averse to expertise forcing, Kathryn Watts accepts what
I take to be the core of that approach, an insistence that agency decisions be based
on statutorily  relevant  factors.   See Watts,  Presidential  Control,  supra  note  Error:
Reference source not found, at 731-732.
231  549  U.S.  497  (2007)  (holding  that  EPA  had  statutory  authority  to  regulate
greenhouse gases and could choose whether or not to exercise that authority solely
on the scientific evidence concerning the risks of climate change).
232 Freeman and Vermeule, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 96.
233 See text accompanying notes 201 to  207, supra.
234 For a discussion of the functions played by hard look review, see Emily Hammond
Meazell  Presidential  Control,  Expertise,  and the  Deference Dilemma,  61 Duke L.J.
1763, 1773-1774.  Jodi Short has highlighted the link between hard look review and
the role of agency expertise and professionalism:
Hard-look  review  has  encouraged  agencies  to  develop  internal
constituencies  of  professionals  who  are  committed  to  scientific,
analytical, and reasoned decision making; and even more importantly,
it has given those constituencies some measure of policymaking clout
within agency organizations.  .  . .  The fact that they must ultimately
justify their decisions on rational grounds gives these professionals a
voice in the organization that they might not otherwise have. 
Jodi L. Short,  The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: Power, Rationality,
and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1868 (2012).
235 Kagan, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 2384.
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The  crux  of  Kagan’s  argument  was  the  need  to  augment
institutions and legal doctrines supporting centralization of  power in
the  White  House.   As  I  have argued,  the  experience of  the  Trump
Administration  has  already  raised  serious  questions  about  the
desirability  of  such  a  shift.  Instead,  if  anything,  we  should  now be
considering whether it would not be wise to shift the balance in the
opposite direction.
Similarly,  it  would be a mistake to make wholesale revisions of
doctrine in response to a single president.  Doctrines must be designed
with a range of possible executive behavior in mind, not on the basis of
one presidency.  But that range has turned out to be broader than
many of us had assumed. The Trump Presidency has highlighted risks
to presidential administration that were less evident previously.  As a
result,  we  need  to  recalibrate  our  expectations  about  presidential
behavior  and  correspondingly  our  understanding  of  the  overall
functioning of the executive branch. Thus, we may gain a newfound
appreciation for some of the institutions and doctrines that may limit
presidential power and reinforce the role of those least beloved of all
figures, the bureaucrats.
VI.  Conclusion
[I would change the Conclusion to look forward about what might
influence what theory ends up being the better fit and how that will
shape the predicted administrative law decisions involving actions by
the Trump Administration.]
[We should wait on this until the other parts are drafted.]
47
